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PluralismAgainst the Demand for Consensus$
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Nicholas Rescher

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236016

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.001.0001

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The Problems of a Consensus Theory of Truth

The Problems of a Consensus Theory of Truth

(p.44) 3 The Problems of a Consensus Theory of Truth

Nicholas Rescher

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses the flaws and problems related to a consensus theory of truth. It suggests that consensus has to be construed in terms of addressing common issues in a common way, but this notion produces a question of how consilience bears on the issue of truth. It evaluates Jürgen Habermas' philosophy concerning consensus and truth and suggests that his rationality via consensus approach is predicated upon very unrealistic expectations of consensus because it fails to provide a means toward achieving something akin to rationality as traditionally conceived.

Keywords:   consensus, truth, Jürgen Habermas, rationality, philosophy

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