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PluralismAgainst the Demand for Consensus$
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Nicholas Rescher

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236016

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.001.0001

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Consensus, Rationality, and Epistemic Morality

Consensus, Rationality, and Epistemic Morality

(p.5) 1 Consensus, Rationality, and Epistemic Morality

Nicholas Rescher

Oxford University Press

This chapter evaluates the importance of consensus in rationality and epistemic morality. It discusses two different approaches to the prospect of disagreement and dissensus and it argues in favour of the policy of dissensus management or the pluralist approach to cognitive, evaluative, and practical affairs. It contends that dissensus and diversity can often play a highly constructive role in human affairs and that contemporary partisans of consensus methodology seriously overestimate the need and desirability of consensualism.

Keywords:   consensus, rationality, epistemic morality, disagreement, dissensus

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