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Is There a God$
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Richard Swinburne

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198235446

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.001.0001

HOW WE EXPLAIN THINGS

Chapter:
(p. 20 ) 2 HOW WE EXPLAIN THINGS
Source:
Is There a God?
Author(s):

Richard Swinburne (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.003.0003

There are two different explanations of events — inanimate or scientific (in terms of the powers and liabilities of objects), and personal (in terms of the powers, beliefs, and purposes of persons). The ‘laws of nature’ are just statements about the powers and liabilities of objects of some kind. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise inexplicable events to be explained, is simple, and fits in with ‘background knowledge’ (knowledge of how things work in fields outside the scope of the hypothesis).

Keywords:   explanation, hypothesis, laws of nature, probability, simplicity

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