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Suez 1956$
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Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen

Print publication date: 1991

Print ISBN-13: 9780198202417

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202417.001.0001

The Aftermath of Suez: Consequences for French Decolonization:

Chapter:
(p. 341 ) 18 The Aftermath of Suez: Consequences for French Decolonization:
Source:
Suez 1956
Author(s):

Adam Watson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202417.003.0019

This chapter assesses the impact of the Suez crisis on French decolonization. De Gaulle, like Macmillan, came to the conclusion that the value of the colonies was less than their cost. His solution was also similar: if the management of the colonies could be handed over to elites who had been educated and trained by the French, then the prospect would be good that French economic and military influence could be sustained. De Gaulle here moved more rapidly than Macmillan, who proceeded in more piecemeal fashion. The British moved more slowly, but they granted fuller independence. In 1960 eleven former French colonies became independent and joined the United Nations. De Gaulle's speed helped to keep the ‘independent’ countries dependent on France.

Keywords:   French decolonization, De Gaulle, Suez crisis, France, military influence, United Nations

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