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Human Action, Consciousness, and Problems of Representation$
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Geeta Ramana

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780198097266

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198097266.001.0001

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Semantic Realism, Empiricism, and Interpretation*

Semantic Realism, Empiricism, and Interpretation*

(p.160) 6 Semantic Realism, Empiricism, and Interpretation*
Human Action, Consciousness, and Problems of Representation

Geeta Ramana

Oxford University Press

Though it is almost impossible to point to something as ‘the act’, what does matter is how we talk about it. In this chapter we argue for realism and representation of action as interpretation. To accept the realist picture of the world as mind-independent allows for the primacy of truth-conditions and objectivity of our representations. Going along Davidsonian lines a theory of truth as a function of interpreted statements that is heavily dependent on communicative agreement is a great starting point. However there is no one way that language ‘hooks’ on to the world and the challenge is to grapple with the tenuous path between the world of objects, world of events and actions.

Keywords:   realism, representation of action, intentionality, language, truth-conditions, anti-realism, human action, intersubjectivity interpretation, empiricism

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