Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Human Action, Consciousness, and Problems of Representation$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Geeta Ramana

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780198097266

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198097266.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 11 December 2018

Structure of Intentions and Action

Structure of Intentions and Action

(p.101) 4 Structure of Intentions and Action
Human Action, Consciousness, and Problems of Representation

Geeta Ramana

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses the logic of intentions and intentionality and their explanatory role in human action. Intentions function in a variety of ways and it is a significant exercise to lay bare the nature of its directionality, notwithstanding the causal versus reason debate on the status of intentions. The structure of intentionality and its relation to action is placed in a holistic context that ranges from the ability to move from the past through the present towards the future. Intentions are discussed as important psychological concepts in the understanding of human action. Here, it is distinguished from other psychological concepts such as desires and beliefs. Concerns about when exactly intentions begin to play a decisive role, lead us to a complex grid of other mental phenomena that need to be adequately positioned in our reasoning process.

Keywords:   intentions, intentionality, language-games, intentional explanations, basic actions, reference, truth

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .