(p.195) Appendix III
(p.195) Appendix III
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation
AIR 1986 SUPREME COURT 180
Coram : 5 Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.I., S. MURTAZA FAZL ALI, V. D. TULZAPURKAR, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ. Writ Petns. Nos. 4610-4612 and 5068-5079 of 1981, D/- 10 -7 -1985.
Vayyapuri Kuppusami and others, Petitioners v. State of Maharashtra and others, Respondents.
CHANDRACHUD, C. J,:- These Writ Petitions portray the plight of lakhs of persons who live on pavements and in slums in the city of Bombay. They constitute nearly half the population of the city. The first group of petitions relates to pavement dwellers while the second group relates to both pavement and Basti or slum dwellers. Those who have made pavements their homes exist in the midst of filth and squalor, which has to be seen to be believed. Rabid dogs in search of stinking meat and cats in search of hungry rats keep them company. They cook and sleep where they ease, for no conveniences are available to them. Their daughters come of age, bathe under the nosy gaze of passers by, unmindful of the feminine sense of bashfulness. The cooking and washing over, women pick lice from each other’s hair. The boys beg. Menfolk, without occupation, snatch chains with the connivance of the defenders of law and order; when caught, if at all, they say: “Who doesn’t commit crimes in this city?”
2. It is these men and women who have come to this Court to ask for a judgment that they cannot be evicted from their squalid shelters without being offered alternative accommodation. They rely for their rights on Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life (p.196) except according to procedure established by law. They do not contend that they have a right to live on the payments. Their contention is that they have a right to live, a right which cannot be exercised without the means of livelihood. They have no option but to flock to big cities like Bombay, which provide the means of bare subsistence. They only choose a pavement or a slum which is nearest to their place of work. In a word, their plea is that the right to life is illusory without a right to the protection of the means by which alone life can be lived. And the right of life can only be taken away or abridged by a procedure established by law, which has to be fair and reasonable, not fanciful or arbitrary such as is prescribed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act or the Bombay Police Act. They also rely upon their right to reside and settle in any part of the country which is guaranteed by Article 19 (f)(e).
3. The three petitioners in the group of Writ Petitions 4610-4612 of 1981 are a journalist and two pavement dwellers. One of these two pavement dwellers, P. Angamuthu, migrated from Salem, Tamil Nadu, to Bombay in the year 1961 in search of employment. He was a landless labourer in his home town but he was rendered jobless because of drought. He found a job in a Chemical Company at Dahisar, Bombay, on a daily wage of Rs. 23 per day. A slum-lord extorted a sum of Rs. 2,500 from him in exchange for a shelter of plastic sheets and canvas on a pavement on the Western Express Highway, Bombay. He lives in it with his wife and three daughters who are 16, 13 and 5 years of age.
4. The second of the two pavement dwellers came to Bombay in 1969 from Sangamner, District Ahmednagar. Maharashtra. He was a cobbler earning 7 to 8 rupees a day, but his so-called house in the village fell down. He got employment in Bombay as a Badli Kamgar for Rs. 350 per month. He was lucky in being able to obtain a ‘dwelling house’ on a pavement at Tulsiwadi by paying Rs. 300 to a goonda of the locality. The bamboos and the plastic sheets cost him Rs. 700.
5. On July 13, 1981, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Shri A. R. Antulay, made an announcement which was given wide publicity by the newspapers that all pavement dwellers in the city of Bombay will be evicted forcibly and deported to their respective places of origin or removed to places outside the city of Bombay. The Chief Minister directed the Commissioner of Police to provide the necessary assistance to respondent 1, the Bombay Municipal Corporation, to demolish the pavement dwellings and deport the pavement dwellers. The apparent justification which the Chief Minister gave to his announcement was: ‘It is a very inhuman existence. These structures are flimsy and open to the elements. During the monsoon there is no way these people can live comfortably.’
6. On July 23, 1981, the pavement dwelling of P. Angamuthu was demolished by the officers of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. He and the members of his family were put in a bus for Salem. His wife and daughters stayed back in Salem but he returned to Bombay in search of a job and got into a pavement house once again. The dwelling of the other petitioner was demolished even (p.197) earlier in January, 1980 but he rebuilt it. It is like a game of hide and seek. The Corporation removes the ramshackle shelters on the pavements with the aid of police, the pavement dwellers flee to less conspicuous pavements in by-lanes and, when the officials are gone, they return to their old habitats. Their main attachment to those places is the nearness thereof to their place of work.
7. In the other batch of Writ Petitions Nos. 5068–79 of 1981, which was heard along with the petitions relating to pavement dwellers, there are 12 petitioners. The first five of those are residents of Kamraj Nagar, a basti or habitation which is alleged to have come into existence in about 1960–61, near the Western Express Highway, Bombay. The next four petitioners were residing in structures constructed off the Tulsi Pipe Road, Mahim, Bombay. Petitioner No. 10 is the Peoples’ Union for Civil Liberties, petitioner No. 11 is the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights while petitioner No. 12 is a journalist.
8. The case of the petitioners in the Kamraj Nagar group of cases is that there are over 500 hutments in this particular basti which was built in about 1960 by persons who were employed by a Construction company engaged in laying water pipes along the Western Express Highway. The residents of Kamraj Nagar are municipal employees, factory or hotel workers, construction supervisors and so on. The residents of the Tulsi Pipe Road hutments claim that they have been living there for 10 to 15 years and that they are engaged in various small trades. On hearing about the Chief Minister’s announcement, they filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay for an order of injunction restraining the officers of the state government and the Bombay Municipal Corporation from implementing the directive of the Chief Minister. The High Court granted an ad interim injunction to be in force until July 21, 1981. On that date, respondents agreed that the huts will not be demolished until October 15, 1981. However, it is alleged that on July 23, 1981 the petitioners were huddled into State Transport buses for being deported out of Bombay. Two infants were born during the deportation but that was set off by the death of two others.
9. The decision of the respondents to demolish the huts is challenged by the petitioners on the ground that it is violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The petitioners also ask for a declaration that the provisions of Ss. 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 are invalid as violating Arts. 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The reliefs asked for in the two groups of writ petitions are that the respondents should be directed to withdraw the decision to demolish the pavement dwellings and the slum hutments and, where they are already demolished, to restore possession of the sites to the former occupants.
10. On behalf of the Government of Maharasthra, a counter-affidavit has been filed by V.S. Munje, Under Secretary in the Department of Housing. The counter-affidavit meets the case of the petitioners thus. The Government of Maharashtra neither proposed to deport any pavement dweller out of the city of (p.198) Bombay nor did it, in fact, deport anyone. Such of the pavement dwellers, who expressed their desire in writing, that they wanted to return to their home towns and who sought assistance from the Government in that behalf were offered transport facilities up to the nearest rail head and were also paid railway fare or bus fare and incidental expenses for the onward journey. The Government of Maharashtra had issued instructions to its officers to visit specific pavements on July 23, 1981 and to ensure that no harassment was caused to any pavement dweller. Out of 10,000 hutment-dwellers who were likely to be affected by the proposed demolition of hutments constructed on the pavements, only 1,024 persons opted to avail of the transport facility and the payment of incidental expenses.
11. The counter-affidavit says that no person has any legal right to encroach upon or to construct any structure on a foot-path, public street or on any place over which the public has a right of way. Numerous hazards of health and safety arise if action is not taken to remove such encroachments. Since, no civic amenities can be provided on the pavements, the pavement dwellers use pavements or adjoining streets for easing themselves. Apart from this, some of the pavement dwellers indulge in anti-social acts like chain-snatching, illicit distillation of liquor and prostitution. The lack of proper environment leads to increased criminal tendencies, resulting in more crime in the cities. It is, therefore, in public interest that public places like pavements and paths are not encroached upon. The Government of Maharashtra provides housing assistance to the weaker sections of the society like landless labourers and persons belonging to low income groups, within the framework of its planned policy of the economic and social development of the State. Any allocation for housing has to be made after balancing the conflicting demands from various priority sectors. The paucity of resources is a restraining factor on the ability of the State to deal effectively with the question of providing housing to the weaker sections of the society. The Government of Maharashtra has issued policy directives that 75 per cent of the housing programme should be allocated to the lower income groups and the weaker sections of the society. One of the objects of the State’s planning policy is to ensure that the influx of population from the rural to the urban areas is reduced in the interest of a proper and balanced social and economic development of the State and of the country. This is proposed to be achieved by reversing the rate of growth of metropolitan cities and by increasing the rate of growth of small and medium towns. The state government has therefore devised an Employment Guarantee Scheme to enable the rural population, which remains unemployed or under employed at certain periods of the year, to get employment during such periods. A sum of about Rs 180 crores was spent on that scheme during the years 1979–80 and 1980–81. On 2 October 1980 the state government launched two additional schemes for providing employment opportunities for those who cannot get work due to old age or (p.199) physical infirmities. The state government has also launched a scheme for providing self-employment opportunities under the ‘Sanjay Gandhi Niradhar Anudan Yojana’. A monthly pension of Rs 60 is paid to those who are too old to work or are physically handicapped. In this scheme, about 1,56,943 persons have been identified and a sum of Rs 2.25 crores was disbursed. Under another scheme called ‘Sanjay Gandhi Swawalamban Yojana’, interest-free loans, subject to a maximum of Rs 2,500, were being given to persons desiring to engage themselves in gainful employment of their own. About 1,75,000 persons had benefited under this scheme, to whom a total sum of Rs 5.82 crores was disbursed by way of loan. In short, the objective of the state government was to place greater emphasis on providing infrastructural facilities to small and medium towns and to equip them so that they could act as growth and service centres for the rural hinterland. The phenomenon of poverty which is common to all developing countries has to be tackled on an all-India basis by making the gains of development available to all sections of the society through a policy of equitable distribution of income and wealth. Urbanisation is a major problem facing the entire country, the migration of people from the rural to the urban areas being a reflection of the colossal poverty existing in the rural areas. The rural poverty cannot, however, be eliminated by increasing the pressure of population on metropolitan cities like Bombay. The problem of poverty has to be tackled by changing the structure of the society, in which there will be a more equitable distribution of income and greater generation of wealth. The state government has stepped up the rate of construction of tenements for the weaker sections of the society from Rs 2,500 to 9,500 per annum.
15. The Municipal Commissioner has stated in his counter-affidavit in Writ Petitions 5068–79 of 1981 that the huts near the Western Express Highway, Vile Parle, Bombay, were constructed on an accessory road which is a part of the Highway itself. These hutments were never regularised by the Corporation and no registration numbers were assigned to them.
16. In answer to the Municipal Commissioner’s counter-affidavit, petitioner No. 12, Prafullachandra Bidwai, who is a journalist, has filed a rejoinder asserting that Kamraj Nagar is not located on a foot-path or a pavement. According to him, Kamraj Nagar is a basti off the Highway, in which the huts are numbered; the record in relation to which is maintained by the Road Development Department and the Bombay Municipal Corporation. Contending that petitioners 1 to 5 have been residing in the said basti for over 20 years, he reiterates that the public has no right of way in or over the Kamraj Nagar. He also disputes that the huts on the foot-paths cause any obstruction to the pedestrians or to the vehicular traffic or that those huts are a source of nuisance or danger to public health and safety. His case in paragraph 21 of his reply-affidavit seems to be that since the foot-paths are in (p.200) the occupation of pavement dwellers for a long time, foot-paths have ceased to be foot-paths.
18. The only other pleading which deserves to be noticed is the affidavit of the journalist petitioner, Ms Olga Tellis, in reply to the counter-affidavit of the Government of Maharashtra. According to her, one of the important reasons of the emergence and growth of squatter-settlements in the Metropolitan cities in India is that the Development and Master Plans of most of the cities have not been adhered to. The density of population in the Bombay Metropolitan Region is not high according to the Town Planning Standards. Difficulties are caused by the fact that the population is not evenly distributed over the region, in a planned manner. New constructions of commercial premises, small-scale industries and entertainment houses in the heart of the city have been permitted by the Government of Maharashtra contrary to law and even residential premises have been allowed to be converted into commercial premises. This, coupled with the fact that the state government has not shifted its main offices to the northern region of the city, has led to the concentration of the population in the southern region due to the availability of job opportunities in that region. Unless economic and leisure activity is decentralised, it would be impossible to find a solution to the problems arising out of the growth of squatter colonies. Even if squatters are evicted, they come back to the city because it is there that job opportunities are available. The alternate pitches provided to the displaced pavement-dwellers on the basis of the so-called 1976 census are not an effective means to their resettlement because those sites are situated far away from the Malad Railway Station involving cost and time which are beyond their means. There are no facilities available at Malavani like schools and hospitals, which drives them back to the stranglehold of the city. The permission granted to the ‘National Centre of Performing Arts’ to construct an auditorium at the Nariman Point, Backbay Reclamation is cited as a ‘gross’ instance of the shortsighted, suicidal and discriminatory policy of the Government of Maharashtra. It is as if the sea is reclaimed for the construction of business and entertainment houses in the centre of the city, which creates job opportunities to which the homeless flock. They work ‘therein and live on pavements. The grievance is that, as a result of this imbalance, there are not enough jobs available in the northern’ tip of the city. The improvement of living conditions in the slums and the regional distribution of job opportunities are the only viable remedies for relieving congestion of the population in the centre of the city. The increase allowed by the state government in the Floor Space Index over and above 1.33 has led to a further concentration of population in the centre of the city.
20. The arguments advanced before us by Ms Indira Jaising, Mr V.M. Tarkunde and Mr Ram Jethmalani cover a wide range but the main thrust of the petitioners’ case is that evicting a pavement dweller or slum dweller (p.201) from his habitat amounts to depriving him of his right to livelihood, which is comprehended in the right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his life except according to procedure established by law.
27. We will first deal with the preliminary objection raised by Mr K.K. Singhvi, who appears on behalf of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, that the petitioners are estopped from contending that their huts cannot be demolished by reason of the fundamental rights claimed by them. …
28. It is not possible to accept the contention that the petitioners are estopped from setting up their fundamental rights as a defence to the demolition of the huts put up by them on pavements or parts of public roads. There can be no estoppel against the Constitution. The Constitution is not only the paramount law of the land but, it is the source and sustenance of all laws. Its provisions are conceived in public interest and are intended to serve a public purpose. The doctrine of estoppel is based on the principle that consistency in word and action imparts certainty and honesty to human affairs. …
32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners’ case, the main plank of their argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by Art. 21 includes the right to livelihood and since they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him (p.202) of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force which propels their desertion of their hearths and homes in the village is the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas J. in Baksey (1954) 347 M.D. 442 that the right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. ‘Life’, as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 US 113, means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332: (AIR 1963 SC 1295).
33. Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy, provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Article 41, which is another Directive Principle, provides, inter alia, that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work in cases of unemployment and of undeserved want. Article 37 provides that the Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any Court, are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country. The Principles contained in Arts. 39(a) and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights. If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21.
34. Learned counsel for the respondents placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in In Re: Sant Ram (1960) 3 SCR 499: (AIR 1960 SC 932) in support of their contention that the right to life, guaranteed by Art. 21 does not include the right to livelihood. Rule 24 of the Supreme Court Rules empowers the Registrar to publish lists of persons who are proved to be habitually acting as touts. The Registrar issued a notice to the appellant and one other person to show cause why their names should not be included in the list of touts. That notice was challenged by the appellant on the ground, inter alia, that it contravenes Article 21 of the Constitution since, by the inclusion of his name (p.203) in the list of touts, he was deprived of his right to livelihood, which is included in the right to life. It was held by a Constitution Bench of this Court that the language of Article 21 cannot be pressed in aid of the argument that the word ‘life’ in Article 21 includes ‘livelihood’ also. This decision is distinguishable because, under the Constitution, no person can claim the right to livelihood by the pursuit of an opprobrious occupation or a nefarious trade or business, like toutism, gambling or living on the gains of prostitution. The petitioners before us do not claim the right to dwell on pavements or in slums for the purpose of pursuing any activity which is illegal, immoral or contrary to public interest. Many of them pursue occupations which are humble but honourable.
36. It is clear from the various expert studies to which we have referred while setting out the substance of the pleadings that one of the main reasons of the emergence and growth of squatter-settlements in big Metropolitan cities like Bombay is the availability of job opportunities which are lacking in the rural sector. The undisputed fact that even after eviction, the squatters return to the cities affords proof of that position. The Planning Commission’s publication, ‘The Report of the Expert Group of Programmes for the Alleviation of Poverty’ (1982) shows that half of the population in India lives below the poverty line, a large part of which lives in villages. A publication of the Government of Maharashtra, ‘Budget and the New 20 Point Socio-Economic Programme’ shows that about 45 lakhs of families in rural areas live below the poverty line and that the average agricultural holding of a farmer, which is 0.4 hectares, is hardly enough to sustain him and his comparatively large family. The landless labourers, who constitute the bulk of the village population, are deeply imbedded in the mire of poverty. It is due to these economic pressures that the rural population is forced to migrate to urban areas in search of employment. The affluent and the not-so-affluent are alike in search of domestic servants. Industrial and business houses pay a fair wage to the skilled workman that a villager becomes in course of time. Having found a job, even if it means washing pots and pans, the migrant sticks to the big city. If driven out, he returns in quest of another job. The cost of public sector housing is beyond his modest means and the less we refer to the deals of private builders the better for all, excluding none. Added to these factors is the stark reality of growing insecurity in villages on account of the tyranny of parochialism and casteism. The announcement made by the Maharashtra Chief Minister regarding the deportation of willing pavement dwellers affords some indication that they are migrants from the interior areas, within and outside Maharashtra. It is estimated that about 200 to 300 people enter Bombay every day in search of employment. These facts constitute empirical evidence to justify the conclusion that persons in the position of petitioners live in slums and on pavements because they have small jobs to nurse in the city and there is no-where else to live. Evidently, they choose a pavement or a slum in the vicinity of their place of work, the time (p.204) otherwise taken in commuting and its cost being forbidding for their slender means. To lose the pavement or the slum is to lose the job. The conclusion, therefore, in terms of the constitutional phraseology is that the eviction of the petitioners will lead to deprivation of their livelihood and consequently to the deprivation of life.
37. Two conclusions emerge from this discussion: one, that the right to life which is conferred by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and two, that it is established that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. But the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty. By Article 21, such deprivation has to be according to procedure established by law. In the instant case, the law which allows the deprivation of the right conferred by Article 21 is the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, the relevant provisions of which are contained in Secs. 312(1), 313(1)(a) and 314.
40. Just as a mala fide act has no existence in the eye of law, even so, unreasonableness vitiates law and procedure alike. It is therefore essential that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his fundamental right, in this case the right to life, must conform to the norms of justice and fairplay. Procedure, which is unjust or unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law which prescribes that procedure and consequently, the action taken under it. Any action taken by a public authority which is invested with statutory powers has, therefore, to be tested by the application of two standards: The action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and secondly, it must be reasonable. If any action, within the scope of the authority conferred by law, is found to be unreasonable, it must mean that the procedure established by law under which that action is taken is itself unreasonable. The substance of the law cannot be divorced from the procedure which it prescribes for, how reasonable the law is, depends upon how fair is the procedure prescribed by it. Sir Raymond Evershed says that ‘The Influence of Remedies on Rights’ (Current Legal Problems 1953, Volume 6.), ‘from the point of view of the ordinary citizen, it is the procedure that will most strongly weigh with him. He will tend to form his judgment of the excellence or otherwise of the legal system from his personal knowledge and experience in seeing the legal machine at work’. Therefore, ‘He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword’ Per Frankfurter J. in Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959) 3 Law ED 2d 1012.”
43. In the first place, footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about (p.205) their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements.
44. The challenge of the petitioners to the validity of the relevant provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is directed principally at the procedure prescribed by Sec. 314 of that Act, which provides by clause (a) that the Commissioner may, without notice, take steps for the removal of encroachments in or upon any street, channel, drain, etc. By reason of Sec. 3(w), ‘street’ includes a causeway, footway or passage. In order to decide whether the procedure prescribed by Sec. 314 is fair and reasonable, we must first determine the true meaning of that section because, the meaning of the law determines its legality. If a law is found to direct the doing of an act which is forbidden by the Constitution or to compel, in the performance of an act, the adoption of a procedure which is impermissible under the Constitution, it would have to be struck down. Considered in its proper perspective, Sec. 314 is in the nature of an enabling provision and not of a compulsive character.
47. The proposition that notice need not be given of a proposed action because there can possibly be no answer to it, is contrary to the well-recognized understanding of the real import of the rule of hearing. That proposition overlooks that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done and confuses one for the other. The appearance of injustice is the denial of justice.
49. The jurisprudence requiring hearing to be given to those who have encroached on pavements and other public properties evoked a sharp response from the respondents’ counsel. ‘Hearing to be given to trespassers who have encroached on public properties; to persons who commit crimes’, they seemed to ask in wonderment. There is no doubt that the petitioners are using pavements and other public properties for an unauthorised purpose. But, their intention or object in doing so is not to ‘Commit an offence or intimidate, insult or annoy any person’ which is the gist of the offence of ‘Criminal trespass’ under section 441 of the Penal Code. They manage to find a habitat in places which are mostly filthy or marshy, out of sheer helplessness. It is not as if they have a free choice to exercise as to whether to commit an encroachment and if so where. …
50. The charge made by the state government in its affidavit that slum and pavement dwellers exhibit special criminal tendencies is unfounded. According to Dr P.K. Muttagi, Head of the unit for urban studies of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay, the surveys carried out in 1972, 1977, 1979 and 1981 show that many families which have chosen the Bombay footpaths just for survival, have been living there for several years and that 53 per cent of the pavement dwellers are self-employed as hawkers in vegetables, flowers, (p.206) ice-cream, toys, balloons, buttons, needles and so on. Over 38 per cent are in the wage-employed category as casual labourers, construction workers, domestic servants and luggage carriers. Only 1. 7 per cent of the total number is generally unemployed. Dr Muttagi found among the pavement dwellers a graduate of Marathwada University and a Muslim poet of some standing. ‘These people have merged with the landscape, become part of it, like the chameleon’, though their contact with their more fortunate neighbours who live in adjoining highrise buildings is casual. The most important finding of Dr Muttagi is that the pavement dwellers are a peaceful lot, ‘for, they stand to lose their shelter on the pavement if they disturb the affluent or indulge in fights with their fellow dwellers. The charge of the state government, besides being contrary to these scientific findings, is born of prejudice against the poor and the destitute. Affluent people living in sky-scrapers also commit crimes varying from living on the gains of prostitution and defrauding the public treasury to smuggling. But, they get away. The pavement dwellers, when caught, defend themselves by asking, “who does not commit crimes in this city?”, As observed by Anand Chakravarti, the separation between existential realities and the rhetoric of socialism indulged in by the wielders of power in the government cannot be more profound. [‘Some Aspects of Inequality in Rural India : A Sociological Perspective’ published in Equality and Inequality, Theory and Practice, edited by André Béteille, 1983 ].
51. Normally, we would have directed the Municipal Commissioner to afford an opportunity to the petitioners to show why the encroachments committed by them on pavements or footpaths should not be removed. But, the opportunity which was denied by the Commissioner was granted by us in an ample measure, both sides having made their contentions elaborately on facts as well as on law. Having considered those contentions, we are of the opinion that the Commissioner was justified in directing the removal of the encroachments committed by the petitioners on pavements, footpaths or accessory roads. …
52. Insofar as the Kamraj Nagar Basti is concerned, there are over 400 hutments therein. The affidavit of the Municipal Commissioner, Shri D.M. Sukhthankar, shows that the Basti was constructed on an accessory road leading to the highway. It is also clear from that affidavit that the hutments were never regularised and no registration numbers were assigned to them by the Road Development Department. Since the Basti is situated on a part of the road leading to the Express Highway, serious traffic hazards arise on account of the straying of the Basti children on to the Express Highway, on which there is heavy vehicular traffic. The same criterion would apply to the Kamraj Nagar Basti as would apply to the dwellings constructed unauthorisedly on other roads and pavements in the city.
53. The affidavit of Shri Arvind V. Gokak, Administrator of the Maharashtra Housing and Areas Development Authority, Bombay, shows that the state government had taken a decision to compile a list of slums which were required (p.207) to be removed in public interest and to allocate, after a spot inspection, 500 acres of vacant land in or near the Bombay Suburban District for resettlement of hutment dwellers removed from the slums. A census was accordingly carried out on January 4, 1976 to enumerate the slum dwellers spread over about 850 colonies all over Bombay. About 67 per cent of the hutment dwellers produced photographs of the heads of their families, on the basis of which the hutments were numbered and their occupants were given identity cards. Shri Gokak further says in his affidavit that the Government had also decided that the slums which were in existence for a long time and which were improved and developed, would not normally be demolished unless the land was required for a public purpose. In the event that the land was so required, the policy of the state government was to provide alternate accommodation to the slum dwellers who were censused and possessed identity cards. The Circular of the state government dated February 4, 1976 (No. SIS/176/D-41) bears out this position. In the enumeration of the hutment dwellers, some persons occupying pavements also happened to be given census cards. The Government decided to allot pitches to such persons at a place near Malavani. These assurances held forth by the Government must be made good. In other words, despite the finding recorded by us that the provision contained in Section 314 of the BMC Act is valid, pavement dwellers to whom census cards were given in 1976 must be given alternate pitches at Malavani though not as a condition precedent to the removal of encroachments committed by them. Secondly, slum dwellers who were censused and were given identity cards must be provided with alternate accommodation before they are evicted. There is a controversy between the petitioners and the state government as to the extent of vacant land which is available for resettlement of the inhabitants of pavements and slums. Whatever that may be, the highest priority must be accorded by the state government to the resettlement of these unfortunate persons by allotting to them such land as the government finds to be conveniently available. The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Act, 1977, the Employment Guarantee Scheme, the New Twenty Point Socio-Economic Programme, 1982, the Affordable Low Income Shelter Programme in Bombay Metropolitan Region and the Programme of House Building for the Economically Weaker Sections must not remain a dead letter as such schemes and programmes often do. Not only that, but more and more such programmes must be initiated if the theory of equal protection of laws has to take its rightful place in the struggle for equality. In these matters, the demand is not so much for less governmental interference as for positive governmental action to provide equal treatment to neglected segments of society. The profound rhetoric of socialism must be translated into practice for the problems which confront the State are problems of human destiny.
54. During the course of arguments, an affidavit was filed by Shri S.K. Jahagirdar, Under Secretary in the Department of Housing, Government of Maharashtra, setting out the various housing schemes which are under the (p.208) consideration of the state government. The affidavit contains useful information on various aspects relating to slum and pavement dwellers. The census of 1976, which is referred to in that affidavit shows that 28.18 lakhs of people were living in 6,27,404 households spread over 1,680 slum pockets. The earning of 80 per cent of the slum households did not exceed Rs. 600 per month. The state government has a proposal to undertake ‘Low Income Scheme Shelter Programme’ with the aid of the World Bank. Under that Scheme, 85,000 small plots for construction of houses would become available, out of which 40,000 would be in Greater Bombay, 25,000 in the Thane-Kalyan area and 20,000 in the New Bombay region. The state government is also proposing to undertake ‘Slum Upgradation Programme (SUP)’ under which basic civic amenities would be made available to the slum dwellers. We trust that these Schemes, grandiose as they appear, will be pursued faithfully and the aid obtained from the World Bank utilised systematically and effectively for achieving its purpose.
55. There is no short term or marginal solution to the question of squatter colonies, nor are such colonies unique to the cities of India. Every country, during its historical evolution, has faced the problem of squatter settlements and most countries of the underdeveloped world face this problem today. Even the highly developed affluent societies face the same problem, though with their larger resources and smaller populations, their task is far less difficult. The forcible eviction of squatters, even if they are resettled in other sites, totally disrupts the economic life of the household.
57. To summarize, we hold that no person has the right to encroach, by erecting a structure or otherwise, on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose like, for example, a garden or a playground that the provision contained in Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is not unreasonable in the circumstances of the case; and that, the Kamraj Nagar Basti is situated on an accessory road leading to the Western Express Highway. We have referred to the assurances given by the state government in its pleadings here which, we repeat, must be made good. Stated briefly, pavement dwellers who were censused or who happened to be censused in 1970 should be given, though not as a condition precedent to their removal, alternate pitches at Malavani or, at such other convenient place as the government considers reasonable but not farther away in terms of distance; slum dwellers who were given identity cards and whose dwellings were numbered in the 1976 census must be given alternate sites for their re-settlement; slums which have been in existence for a long time, say for twenty years or more, and which have been improved and developed will not be removed unless the land on which they stand or the appurtenant land is required for a public purpose, in which case, alternate sites or accommodation will be provided to them; the ‘Low Income Scheme Shelter Programme’ which is proposed to be undertaken with the aid of the World Bank will be pursued earnestly; and the ‘Slum Upgradation (p.209) Programme (SUP)’ under which basic amenities are to be given to slum dwellers will be implemented without delay. In order to minimise the hardship involved in any eviction, we direct that the slums, wherever situated, will not be removed until one month after the end of the current monsoon season, that is, until October 31, 1985 and, thereafter, only in accordance with this judgment. If any slum is required to be removed before that date parties may apply to this Court. Pavement dwellers, whether censused or uncensused, will not be removed until the same date, viz. October 31, 1985.
58. The Writ Petitions will stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.