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Why Political Liberalism?On John Rawls's Political Turn$
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Paul Weithman

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780195393033

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195393033.001.0001

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Kantian Congruence and the Unified Self

Kantian Congruence and the Unified Self

Chapter:
(p.183) VII Kantian Congruence and the Unified Self
Source:
Why Political Liberalism?
Author(s):

Paul Weithman (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195393033.003.0008

The second of Rawls's two main congruence arguments is “the Kantian Congruence Argument”. This chapter reconstructs that argument, showing how it depends upon Rawls's immediately preceding treatments of dominant ends and the unity of the self. It also shows that the conditions of the original position allow it to “bridge” the right and the good. The chapter shows that the original position is an essential part of justice as fairness, as that view is developed in Theory of Justice. It concludes by returning to the contrast between Rawls and Hobbes drawn in Chapter II.

Keywords:   Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls, Immanuel Kant, Christine Korsgaard, Joshua Cohen, original position, bridge function, unity of the self, dominant ends, Kantian interpretation

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