This book looks at an oddity of modern history — the broad diffusion of temperance legislation in the early 20th century — to make a broad argument about how bad policy ideas achieve international success. The root question is this: how could a bad policy idea — one that was widely recognized by experts as bad before adoption, and which ultimately failed everywhere — come to be adopted throughout the world? To answer it, the author uses an institutionalist approach, and focuses in particular on the US, Russia/USSR (ironically, one of the only laws the Soviets kept on the books was the Tsarist ... More

This book looks at an oddity of modern history — the broad diffusion of temperance legislation in the early 20th century — to make a broad argument about how bad policy ideas achieve international success. The root question is this: how could a bad policy idea — one that was widely recognized by experts as bad before adoption, and which ultimately failed everywhere — come to be adopted throughout the world? To answer it, the author uses an institutionalist approach, and focuses in particular on the US, Russia/USSR (ironically, one of the only laws the Soviets kept on the books was the Tsarist temperance law), and Sweden. Conventional wisdom, based largely on the US experience, blames evangelical zealots for the success of the temperance movement. Yet as this book shows, prohibition was adopted in ten countries other than the United States, as well as countless colonial possessions; all with similar disastrous consequences, and in every case followed by repeal. This study focuses on the dynamic interaction of ideas and political institutions, tracing the process through which concepts of dubious merit gain momentum and achieve credibility as they wend their way through institutional structures.