Some theorists argue that ordinary principles of rationality cannot explain coordination in games in which players make moves simultaneously, and so they propose novel principles of rationality to explain coordination, such as principles of constrained maximization or team reasoning. However, players in a game with simultaneous moves may coordinate by inferring their counterparts' strategies. In fact, the principle of utility maximization, appropriately applied, supports solutions to coordination problems, at least in ideal circumstances. An ideal agent need not be hyperrational in the sense that she intends to perform an act just in case the act maximizes utility. A utility‐maximizing agent may intend to perform an act because of the intention's consequences and may later execute the intention because of the act's consequences. Forming an intention to perform an act provides an easily controlled commitment to performing the act.
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