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Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good
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Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good

Sergio Tenenbaum

Abstract

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has rece ... More

Keywords: good, desire, intentional explanations, practical reasoning, Guise of the Good, deliberation, ethics, philosophy of action

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2010 Print ISBN-13: 9780195382440
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Sergio Tenenbaum, editor
Author Webpage