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The Possibility of Philosophical UnderstandingReflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud$
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Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-hung Wong

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780195381658

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.001.0001

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Intelligible Causation

Intelligible Causation

Chapter:
(p.232) 11 Intelligible Causation
Source:
The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding
Author(s):

John Campbell

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.003.0011

I review Barry Stroud's seminal discussion of color in The Quest for Reality. I suggest that his approach ultimately depends on a causal theory of reference for color terms; that he operates with an interpretationist version of a causal theory of reference. He also holds that color is not to be analyzed as a disposition of objects to produce color experiences in us. This puts a lot of pressure on his account of how exactly colors cause our thought and talk about color. I propose that we can best round out his discussion here by thinking of the way color causes our thought and talk about color in the context of a broader class of relations of intelligible causation.

Keywords:   color, causation, intelligible causation, reference, space, Stroud

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