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Conscious Will and ResponsibilityA Tribute to Benjamin Libet$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195381641

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.001.0001

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Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility

Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility

(p.124) Chapter 11 Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility
Conscious Will and Responsibility

Deborah Talmi

Chris D. Frith (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter reinterprets Libet's results in light of a distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 mental processing. It uses this framework to explain why we have a conscious experience of our own free will, and discusses potential moral consequences of seeing apparent free will as an illusion.

Keywords:   free will, responsibility, moral behavior, consciousness, mental processing

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