Somebody Else's Problem?
This chapter considers a mainstream and optimistic analysis of the global storm. It fleshes out that analysis by appeal to a simple public goods model, and a simple game theoretic model, the battle of the sexes. It argued that the optimistic analysis fails both in practice and in theory. In practice, neither Kyoto nor the Copenhagen agreement corresponds to the model of a small group of cooperators trying to enforce a ceiling on emissions, and so supply the public good of climate stability for themselves and others. In theory, none of the main claims of the broader battle of the sexes model—Partial Cooperation, Internal Motivation, and Passive Cooperation ‐ seems likely to be true of climate change. The scale of the problem is simply too large, and the incentives to undermine an agreement too great, at least in the short‐ to medium‐term.
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