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The Moral Skeptic
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The Moral Skeptic

Anita M. Superson

Abstract

This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position fr ... More

Keywords: action skeptic, amoralist, consistency, disposition skeptic, expected utility, Interdependency Thesis, internalism, motive skeptic, privilege, self-interest

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2009 Print ISBN-13: 9780195376623
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Anita M. Superson, author
University of Kentucky
Author Webpage

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