(p.437) Appendix 9 Fides and (Roman and Foreign) Clientelae
(p.437) Appendix 9 Fides and (Roman and Foreign) Clientelae
While the fundamental understanding of fides has always remained the same (“confidence,” “faith,” “trust”),1 its particular meanings and applications could differ depending on individual situations.2 The majority opinion has been, however, that the status of dediticii, that is, those who surrendered to the fides of the Roman people, was similar to that of clients.3 The latter are thought to have been under the protection of their patrons, which they received in return for their loyalty and service. A still classic definition has been offered by Ernst Badian: “The client may be described as an inferior entrusted, by custom or by himsef, to the protection of a stranger more powerful than he, by rendering certain services and observances in return for this protection,” so that “the various classes of clientela are united by the fact that they comprise relationships admittedly between superior and inferior.”4 We also know, however, of cases where the dediticii received cruel treatment from the Romans,5 which makes this general identification of dediticii with clients questionable.
Fides was, of course, a necessary component of the Roman clientela. What is important to make absolutely clear, however, is that fides alone did not constitute the totality of the (p.438) client-patron relationship.6 On the one hand, “(dis)loyalty” and “(un)faithfulness” are, first and foremost, qualities of clients:7 as Peter Brunt has noted, the “patron is never said to be ‘in fide clientis.’” Hence, fides, as an unconditional pledge of loyalty, came only from the one who surrendered himself.8 We see fides clientum in Plautus early in the second century B.C., or fidos domino clientes in Statius at the end of the first century A.D.9 Sallust speculated that Piso was killed by Pompey’s clients, who remained loyal to their patron; Valerius Maximus referred to L. Villius Annalis, who died during the proscriptions of 42 B.C. and failed to be saved by his client’s loyalty; and, at a later date, Fronto compared clients to loyal freedmen.10 On the other hand, to surrender to someone’s fides was the same as to entrust oneself to that person or, in other words, to put oneself in that person’s trust, as both Terence (early second century B.C.) and Ampelius (fourth century A.D.) confirm.11 This does not mean, however, that the trust (fides) of the one who thus surrendered himself was automatically going to be reciprocated.
The patron-client relationship included, therefore, not only the trust (fides) of the inferior partner but also the offer of protection (patrocinium) by the senior partner. In this sense, Cicero referred to the “protection of province” (patrocinium provinciae) and the “protection of peace” (patrocinium pacis), whereas Apuleius spoke of heaven’s “protection,” which came in return for “innocence and loyalty” (fides).12 Hence, the relations between patron and client were defined as clientela et fides: for example, Terence’s Thaïs pledged her submission and trust (in clientelam et fidem) to the father of Chaereas, and Cicero referred to his contemporaries who did exactly the same.13 Only by extending patrocinium to the one who had entrusted himself to one did the latter person become his patron, thus establishing an agreement between the two that implied mutual obligations, as we see in the Law of the Twelve Tables.14 There was no contradiction between the meaning of fides as complete, or unconditional, trust and patrocinium, the protection that clients and wards received from their patrons and guardians, respectively: once fides was accepted and reciprocated, an agreement was established, and the one who had surrendered himself to someone else’s fides was expected to receive protection from the latter person.15
(p.439) In one of the two well-known Roman definitions of fides, Cicero interpreted this word as unquestionably “good faith,” which implied a moral obligation. As “truth and fidelity to promises and agreements,” fides was the foundation of “justice” (iustitia).16 The violation of one’s oath was the violation of fides.17 In Cicero’s words, an oath was the best way to guarantee fides. He also referred to treaties in which fides was pledged “even to the enemy.” Two centuries later, Aulus Gellius, while trying to establish the hierarchy of obligations (de gradu atque ordine officiorum), came up with the following observations, which were clearly based on earlier texts and also reflected the opinion of Gellius’s contemporaries: “[I]n accordance with the usage of the Roman people (ex moribus populi Romani) the place next after parents should be held by wards entrusted to our faith and guardianship (fidei tutelaeque); that second to them came clients, who also committed themselves to our faith and protection (in fidem patrociniumque); that then in the third place guests; and finally relations by blood and by marriage.” Cicero’s fides as “good faith” existed only within the framework of agreements and obligations (whether written or oral, such as oaths), whereas for Gellius only fides tutelaque or fides patrociniumque constituted obligations. Not surprisingly, bonae fidei iudicia consisted only of agreements that were based on mutual obligations, including tutelae.18 Both authors thus drew the same conclusion in two different ways: the fides of the one who surrendered himself to someone else did not by itself constitute an agreement between the two parties.19
A particular understanding of fides depended, therefore, on the situation in which fides was used or, more precisely, whether or not the two sides had an agreement of some sort between themselves.20 Because in surrendering to someone else’s power, fides did not, by itself, establish any sort of agreement—and, therefore, did not result in any obligations to the dediticius—neither Cicero nor Gellius mentioned deditio to the fides of the Roman people. The reason they passed over such cases is simple: a deditio in fidem only meant that the dediticii “entrusted” themselves to the Romans. Since the relations between the Romans and the dediticii were not determined by either law or custom, the Romans had no moral, much less legal, obligations to the dediticii and could treat them as they pleased. Fides thus designated the “trust” of the dediticii in Roman discretion to decide their fate, without implying any commitment from the Roman side. This fides could not be “broken” by the Romans because it did not constitute any sort of agreement between the Romans and the dediticii. Only after the act of deditio in fidem took place did the Romans determine the status of the dediticii by establishing some sort of relations with them. Here, too, the Roman attitude was far from certain because deditio could result in several options: from enslaving the dediticii to giving them amicitia or establishing a treaty with them.21
(p.440) Therefore, Livy’s words about the Roman patrocinium over Greek cities after the Roman defeat of Antiochos probably reflected the changing attitudes of the Romans, who now indeed regarded the Greeks as their clients.22 As patrons of the Greeks, the Romans now offered them patrocinium. This same system was extended elsewhere as well. In Florus’s words, the Numidian kingdom was in the “trust and protection” (fide et clientela) of the senate and the people of Rome by the time of the Jugurthine war.23 In the forties, Cicero no longer labeled Roman rule as imperium, but as patrocinium, because, in his words, Roman magistrates and generals (magistratus imperatoresque) strove to defend provinces and allies with justice and loyalty (aequitate et fide).24 He was obviously referring to those territories and people that had established relations with Rome: aequitas implied the presence of some sort of mutual agreement, and we also know that ius est ars aequi et boni, according to the famous phrase of Celsus.25
The patron-client relationship could also be established as a private mutual agreement on the basis of some legal enactment. In one such case, the Spaniards as allies (socii) complained to the senate about the avarice and arrogance of Roman magistrates (de magistratuum Romanorum avaritia superbiaque), and a senatus consultum was issued (171) that gave the Spaniards an opportunity to choose whomever they wished as advocates (“patrons”).26 The senatus consultum served as the legal basis of the relationship between the clients and patrons. Surely the understanding was that the chosen persons would agree to act as advocates for the Spaniards. A couple of decades later, the lex repetundarum, which made provisions for selecting patrons for those people who wished to prosecute under this law but could not be heard in court because of their non-citizen status, gave such clients an opportunity to repudiate their patrons, but only because their relations with clients had to be established on the basis of this law.27
Cicero’s vision of Roman rule as patrocinium was probably derived, at least in part, from numerous individual cases of patronage over foreign communities, such as those that we see in a series of inscriptions from approximately the same time. Here, too, the relationship was based on reciprocal obligations: once a community asked someone for patronage and this person agreed, he extended to this community his “allegiance and protection” (fidem clientelamque), thus turning himself into its patron.28 A hundred years later, Pliny the Younger described how the envoys from the province of Baetica complained about (p.441) their former governor before the senate and asked that Pliny be appointed their advocate. The senate adopted such a decision, provided Pliny agreed.29 Then Pliny said the following: “They begged for my loyalty (implorantes fidem meam), which they experienced when I was their counsel against Baebius, and alleged their claim upon me by referring to the agreement of patronage (adlegantes patrocinii foedus).” A patron’s fides could only be begged for, and only when the agreement of patrocinium existed. It was the combination of the decision of the senate and Pliny’s own consent that constituted such an agreement in this case.30
Because the establishment of a patron-client relationship implied not only the surrender of the inferior but also the agreement of the superior to extend his patrocinium in return for loyalty,31 the question arises about when foreign clientelae came into being. If we follow a broad definition of clientela, such as “relationships between superior and inferior,”32 then the origin of foreign clientelae should indeed be dated to the moment when Rome began spreading her power outside of Italy, that is, the First Punic war—and this is where Badian’s famous investigation began. From this point of view, the status of Sicilian cities, the Illyrian wars, the relationship between Saguntum and Rome, and the Roman-Aetolian treaty—all represented different aspects of the extension of Rome’s foreign clientela.33 But if we avoid such a broad definition of clientela,34 Rome did not necessarily take on obligations with respect to the status and privileges of those communities that had surrendered to her fides. The Romans only offered their “protection” to these communities against third parties. We can hardly consider this “protection” by itself a valid proof of the existence of patron-client relations35—if Rome chose to “defend” the dediticii against some other power, this was only to safeguard Roman interests. It provided no guarantees to the dediticii against Rome herself.36 The Romans thus used deditio in fidem to promote their own political interests by claiming to protect the dediticii against third parties,37 that is, in the same way various Greek political powers had used the slogan of freedom both before and after the coming of the Romans.
(p.442) Marcellus’s relations with Syracuse have been considered the earliest case of Roman “patronage by conquest” over a Greek community (and the “classic example” of deditio in fidem),38 or maybe even the earliest case of Roman patronage in general, if the Samnite clientela of C. Fabricius Luscinus was a later invention, as some have thought.39 Several ancient texts speak of Marcellus’s relations with the Syracusans. Livy’s evidence, which has been the basis for the examination of this problem, consists of two references. The first deals with the embassy of the Syracusans to Marcellus in 212, at a time when a part of the city had already been taken by the Romans and the rest of its citizens preferred to negotiate their surrender. According to Livy, one of the Syracusan ambassadors, while trying to protect his city, spoke to Marcellus as follows: “Hand down Syracuse unscathed to your family to be kept in the clientela and protection (sub clientela tutelaque) of the name of the Marcelli.”40 The reliability of such evidence, which was clearly based on Livy’s knowledge about this family’s patronage of the Sicilians, has been rightly doubted.41 These doubts have been strengthened because, after some time, the Syracusans accused Marcellus of harsh treatment and requested the restoration of the property they lost when he captured their city. The senators, however, approved of whatever Marcellus had done to Syracuse, and when the decree of the senate was read, the Syracusan envoys “threw themselves at Marcellus’ feet, begging him to forgive the complaints they had made in trying to mitigate their calamity, and asked that he accept them and their city Syracuse in his fides and clientela. Having been confirmed by the senate decree, he spoke to them kindly and let them go.”42
On neither of the two occasions does Livy say that Marcellus became the patron of Syracuse. If the Syracusans made him another offer, this would mean that he had not accepted the first one (or that it was not made at all). Since Livy offers no details, there is every reason to believe that Marcellus did not become patron of Syracuse after the second offer either, if such an offer was ever made.43 It has recently been argued that here, too, “patronage has been imported into a context where it did not originally appear.”44 Livy’s reference to the Syracusans allegedly begging Marcellus to accept them in fidem et clientelam is certainly reminiscent of the same formula being actively used in the establishment of patron-client relations between the Romans and various communities in Livy’s own time, as we have seen above.45 Such agreements (p.443) required the voluntary consent of both parties and had nothing to do with “patronage by conquest.” Nor did the alleged appeal of the Syracusans for Marcellus’s fides clientelaque, which Livy put in 210, have any connection with their surrender (sub clientela tutelaque nominis Marcellorum, according to Livy) in 212.
Another interesting detail about the Syracusan embassy to Rome in 210, which does not seem to have received any noticeable attention so far, is that the Syracusans complained of harsh treatment and loss of property against Marcellus before the senate, which would be out of place if the city had been taken by force or surrendered to the mercy (in fidem) of the Romans.46 The Syracusans probably had some justifications to have filed such a complaint. Plutarch’s text helps us to clarify the matter. According to his Life of Marcellus, in 210, the Syracusans came to Rome to complain of terrible acts committed against them in circumvention of a “treaty” (δεινὰ καὶ παράσπονδα πεπονθότας)—although “friends and allies” (σύμμαχοι καὶ φίλοι) of Rome, they were treated like enemies (τῶν πολεμίων).47 Judging by the answer of Marcellus, their complaint concerned the harsh treatment they received after Syracuse was taken by the Romans, which Marcellus explained by the necessities of war. The senators voted in favor of Marcellus, and the envoys “fell at his feet, begging him with tears to remit his wrath against the embassy there present, and to take pity on the rest of the city.”48 Then the reconciliation took place.
The Syracusans thus claimed that they had the status of “friends and allies,” which Valerius Maximus also seems to confirm, as he ended his description of what happened in 210 by praising Marcellus’s moderation “toward our allies” (adversus socios).49 The appeal of the Syracusans reveals that some sort of treaty (sponde) with Rome already existed prior to surrendering their city to Marcellus in 212. This was the basis of their accusations in 210. Because in 210, after acquitting Marcellus, the senate confirmed “the freedom, which he had restored to them, as well as their laws and what they kept of their possessions,” all of this should have been included in the agreement which the Syracusans and Marcellus established before the Romans entered Syracuse in 212. Therefore, we are dealing with a prearranged surrender of the city. Other such cases include the surrender of Tarentum in 209 and the second surrender of Phocaea in 190. The people of Tarentum sued for peace “with freedom and their own laws.”50 The Phocaeans had bargained to have the same conditions that they received when they surrendered the first time and that they should not be treated as “enemies.”51 Then, however, Roman soldiers began plundering the city, and Phocaea eventually suffered the same fate as Syracuse had in 212.
The evidence that we have about Marcellus’s relations with Syracuse in the late third century thus supports neither the idea of his patronage over that city, whether “by conquest” or through the deditio in fidem, nor the idea that he, in fact, became the patron of that city at all. There is no reason, therefore, to think that Plutarch’s account “corresponded” to that of Livy.52 (p.444) Chronologically, the next of the known Roman patrons of the Greeks were one Marcellus, who was mentioned as “patron” in an honorific inscription from Delphi that has once been dated to 173, and L. Aemilius Paullus, who allegedly established a “clientela by conquest” after his victory at Pydna in 168. These two instances can be questioned, however: the inscription from Delphi has been redated to the first century B.C. and connected with another Marcellus,53 whereas Plutarch’s evidence about Paullus hardly points to him as patron of the Greeks.54 Plutarch says only that after Aemilius’s death, the Iberians, Ligurians, and Macedonians, “who chanced to be present,” participated in some way in his funeral and “called aloud upon Aemilius as benefactor and savior of their countries.” Not surprisingly, Plutarch’s words have been found insufficient to prove Paullus’s patronage over the Macedonians.55
It looks as if no reliable evidence exists to support the idea of Roman patronage over Greeks by the mid-second century. However, we do see how this patronage emerged in the 180s, as demonstrated by the letter of the Scipio brothers to Heraclea, which has been surprisingly neglected in discussions on foreign clientelae.56 The Romans pledged to preserve the status of Heraclea, and other Greek cities, in return for their loyalty: Roman patrocinium reciprocated Greek fides, thus signaling the beginning of Roman patronage in Greece. While the name of Flamininus was associated by some of the Greeks with fides,57 there is no indication that Flamininus was the author of this new form of interrelationship between the Romans and Greeks—no evidence exists concerning T. Quinctius Flamininus’s patronage over the Greeks either, even though Flamininus was also praised as “savior” by the Greeks.58
In sum, deditio in fidem alone did not create Roman foreign clientelae. Nor did a prearranged deditio, even though—unlike deditio in fidem—as an agreement established before the surrender took place, a prearranged surrender offered certain guarantees to the dediticii and, therefore, instituted a sort of agreement between the two sides. Foreign clientelae, like any clientela, were established only when the fides of the dediticii, who had surrendered themselves to the trust (fides) of the Roman people (or, in other words, surrendered unconditionally), was reciprocated by an offer of patrocinium, which safeguarded the status and rights of the dediticii. Such evidence emerged only in the early second century B.C., namely, in the course of the Roman war against Antiochos III. Therefore, on the basis of the available evidence, this should be considered the time of the foundation of Roman clientelae in the Greek East.59
(2.) E.g., Fraenkel, “Geschichte,” 198; Badian, Clientelae, 1; Lombardi, “Bona fides,” 4–5, 15–16.
(3.) E.g., B. Paradisi, in Studi di storia e diritto in onore di A. Solmi (Milan: Giuffrè, 1941), 1:291–293; Piganiol, “Venire in fidem,” 346; Imbert, “Fides,” 347–348; Heurgon, Rome, 193; Muylle, “Traité,” 408–409; I. E. M. Edlund, in Klio 59 (1977): 135–136; Valvo, “Istituti,” 169; Bernhardt, Rom, 25; Hölkeskamp, Reconstructing the Roman Republic, 33–34.
(4.) Badian, Clientelae, 1, 11. Cf. J.-M. David, Le patronat judiciaire au dernier siècle de la république romaine (Rome: École française de Rome, 1992), 50: “le patronus, défenseur de son client.”
(5.) The Ligurians: Liv. 42.8.1–6; the Lusitanians: Cic. Brut. 89; Liv. per. 49, with p. 260, n. 194.
(6.) Pace J. Imbert, “De la sociologie au droit: La ‘Fides’ romaine,” in Droits de l’antiquité et sociologie juridique: Mélanges H. Lévy-Bruhl (Paris: Sirey, 1959), 407–409; Brunt, “Clientela,” 385; David, Le patronat, 57, who limited his research only to the “patronat judiciaire”; Hölkeskamp, “Fides,” 112, 115–117; Hölkeskamp, Reconstructing the Roman Republic, 34.
(7.) E.g., Sall. Iug. 71.5 and further examples in nn. 9–11 below.
(8.) Brunt, “Clientela,” 406. See, e.g., Fraenkel, “Geschichte,” 194–196; Freyburger, Étude, 153–154, on the fides of clients to patrons. Cf. Hölkeskamp, Reconstructing the Roman Republic, 34: a holder of imperium accepted the vanquished “into his fides by the formal act of deditio.”
(9.) Plaut. Menaech. 576; Stat. Silv. 3.3.110.
(10.) Sall. Cat. 19.5; Val. Max. 9.11.6; Front. Ad verum imp. 2.7.2.
(11.) Ter. Eunuch. 886; Ampel. Lib. mem. 49.3. Cf. The Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. P. G. W. Glare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), s.v. fides: (1) “the condition of having trust placed in one, trust, tutelage.”
(12.) Cic. Scaur. 26 and Cic. Philip. 7.3; Apul. Metam. 11.16.9.
(13.) Ter. Eunuch. 1039; e.g., Cic. Rosc.Amer. 93: in cuius fide sint et clientela, 107.
(14.) FIRA 2 I, no. 7, 8.21. Imbert, “Fides,” 352, 354; David, Le patronat, 83–89, on the diligentia of patronus.
(15.) Pace Imbert, “Sociologie,” 407–408, 411–412, who attempted to explain this resulting protection by the social context of such relations. It is true, of course, that surrendering to someone else’s trust, or mercy, was not defined by itself in legal terms; or, in other words, this act alone did not establish any legal relationship between the two sides. But then the question is what it was in such cases that guaranteed protection to a client or a ward. Protection implied reciprocity and some sort of agreement between the two sides, for which an “habitual social behavior” was simply not enough. Not surprisingly, when discussing protection that came in return for fides, Imbert himself mentions such agreements, including the Law of XII Tables, the Institutes, and the Digest.
(16.) Cic. De Off. 1.23: fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.
(17.) Cic. De Off. 3.104: qui ius igitur iurandum violat, is fidem violat.
(18.) Cic. De Off. 3.111; Gell. 5.13.1–2; Gaius 4.62.
(19.) See also Mommsen, “Clientel,” 363.
(20.) Cf. M. Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, trans. R. Seager (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 62–69, incl. 65–66: “the nature of fides is revealed in passages where it is combined with other concepts: patrocinium, clientela, praesidium, amicitia, hospitium.” The use of fides with each of these words indicated a special case, however, that reflected this or that form of reciprocal obligations.
(21.) Esp. Badian, “Deditio,” 361 (see p. 260, n. 191).
(22.) Liv. 34.58.11 (193 B.C.) and 37.54.17 reproducing the speech of the Rhodian ambassadors to the senate (hoc patrocinium receptae in fidem et clientelam vestram universae gentis perpetuum vos praestare decet), but reflecting, first and foremost, the Roman understanding of what constituted the clientela (188 B.C.). More detail: chapter 7.
(23.) Flor. 1.36.3: quorum in fide et clientela regnum erat.
(24.) Cic. De Off. 2.27: itaque illud patrocinium orbis terra verius quam imperium poterat nominari.
(25.) Anonym., Dig. 184.108.40.206.
(26.) Liv. 43.2.3 and 4: vocatis in curiam legatis recitatum est senatus consultum, iussique nominare patronos.
(27.) Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford et al. (London: Institute of Classical Studies; University of London, 1996), p. 66, no. 1, ll.11–12, incl. l.11: eum que[i e]x h(ace) l(ege) patronus datus erit (the Lex repetundarum, c. middle or late second century B.C.?). This and other such evidence has been discussed by Gelzer (Nobility, 63–65, 70–86) as “patronage in the courts,” which implied a commitment on both sides.
(28.) ILS 6093–6115, incl., e.g., 6098.4–7 and 8–10 (A.D. 6) and 6100.4–11 (A.D. 27). See, in general, J. Nicols, in ANRW II 13 (1980): 535–561 on the period from 50 B.C. to A.D. 250.
(29.) Plin. Ep. 3.4.4: ut darer provincialibus patronus, se ab ipso me impetrassent.
(30.) A similar case of the patrocinium of a province in Cic. Scaur. 26 (see n. 12 above).
(31.) David, Le patronat, 68; T. Cornell, “Cliens,” in OCD 3, 348. Harmand, Le patronat, 34–39, distinguished this form of relationship as only one of several ways of “acquisition de patronat.” But the extension of patronage was, of course, not the same as a receptio of surrender to fides.
(32.) As Badian, Clientelae, 11 (see n. 4 above). Cf. Brunt, “Clientela,” 383 (“relations of dependence”) and 387 (on “clientship in the strict sense”).
(33.) Badian, Clientelae, 39–40, 43–47, and 49–50, respectively. Saguntum: Polyb. 3.14.9–10, 3.20.5–6, 3.30.1 (the Saguntines had placed themselves in Roman trust: εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, but the Romans had no obligations to Saguntum). Dahlheim, “Deditio,” 212, on the Roman-Aetolian treaty of 189 as “Klientelvertrag.”
(34.) The criticism of Badian’s theory, by those who wished to see amicitia where Badian saw clientela, seems to have passed over Badian’s broad definition of clientela: e.g., P. J. Burton, in Klio 85 (2003): 333–369.
(35.) Pace Harmand, Le patronat, 27–33, who distinguished “the patronage over a city, consequence of a mission of civil or military character” as one of the “ways of acquiring patronage”; Dahlheim, “Deditio,” 279–280.
(37.) Esp. Harris, War, 34–35, 189–190.
(38.) Mommsen, “Clientel,” 361 n. 10 (who, however, quite appropriately spoke of “the patronage of the Marcelli over Syracuse and other Sicilian cities”); E. Albertini, in Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire 24 (1904): 252; Harmand, Le patronat, 14; Badian, Clientelae, 7, 157; David, Le patronat, 74; Rawson, Roman Culture and Society, 107 n. 28; Canali De Rossi, Le ambascerie, 645; C. F. Eilers, Roman Patrons of Greek Cities (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 51: “the locus classicus of patronage by conquest.”
(39.) G. Forni, in Athenaeum, n.s., 31 (1953): 177–178; Badian, Clientelae, 7, 157; J. Bleicken, review of Badian, Clientelae, Gnomon 36 (1964): 183–184; Gruen, Hellenistic World, 163. Eilers, Patrons, 57–58, argued that M.’ Curius Dentatus (cos. 290) had the Samnites as his clients. Even if this was the earliest example of Roman “patronage by conquest,” it is irrelevant to this investigation, which is concerned with Greek communities.
(40.) Liv. 25.29.6.
(41.) Eilers, Patrons, 52. The Marcelli as the patrons of the Sicilians: Cic. Verr. 2.3.45, 2.4.89–90; Ps.-Ascon. 187 (Stangl.). But M. Claudius Marcellus is never referred to as the patron of Syracuse (and Mommsen rightly spoke in general terms; see n. 38 above).
(42.) Liv. 26.32.7–8. Cf. Val. Max. 4.1.7: et orantes ut ab eo in clientelam reciperentur clementer excepit.
(43.) Pace Gruen, Hellenistic World, 163: in 210, Marcellus accepted Syracuse in fidem clientelamque.
(44.) Eilers, Patrons, 54, and 53–56 in general.
(45.) Liv. 26.32.8 (see n. 42 above). Cf. ILS 6093–6115 (see n. 28 above).
(46.) But see David, Le patronat, 74, and J. B. Rives, in CP 88 (1993): 33 (in 210, the Syracusans “accused Marcellus before the Senate of violating the terms of surrender”), neither of whom, however, elaborated on this point.
(47.) Plut. Marcell. 23.1, 4.
(48.) Plut. Marcell. 23.4–5 and 6, respectively. Cf. Liv. 26.32.7.
(49.) Val. Max. 4.1.7.
(50.) Liv. 27.21.8: cum libertate ac legibus suis.
(51.) Liv. 37.32.9–14, incl. 10: pacti ne quid hostile paterentur.
(52.) A. Klotz, in RhM 83 (1934): 305–309, on various other differences in the two accounts, who explained them by Plutarch’s following a different (Latin) source, which Klotz tentatively identified as the text of Antias.
(53.) Harmand, Le patronat, 32, 73, with reference to BCH 6 (1882): 449 no. 78 (173 B.C.) = Syll. 3 774a (23 B.C.); cf. Dittenberger ad hoc (M. Marcellus, the first husband of Julia) and Eilers, Patrons, 198–199 C13 (M. Claudius Marcellus [cos. 51 B.C.]), both of whom were thus inclined to date this inscription to the first century B.C.
(54.) Mommsen, “Clientel,” 361 n. 10, and Harmand, Le patronat, 14, with reference to “Plut. Aem. 39.”
(55.) Plut. Aem. 39.8. See Eilers, Patrons, 50–51.
(56.) No reference to this letter has been made by Badian or Eilers. Harmand, Le patronat, 73 n. 68; 75 n. 81, noted this instance under “Patronat et Proxenie.” Dahlheim, Gewalt, 194 n. 54, referred to it in passing.
(57.) E.g., the hymn of praise to Flamininus: Plut. Flam. 16.4; the speech of Flamininus in 194: Liv. 34.50.1.
(58.) E.g., Syll.3 592 = IG V.1, 1165 (Gytheum, c.195 B.C.) and IG XII.9, 931.5 (Chalcis); Plut. Flam. 16.
(59.) Gelzer, Nobility, 86–101 (“Patronage and community”) went no further into the past than the second century B.C.