(p.381) Appendix 1 The End of the Theban Affiliation with the Second Athenian Confederacy
(p.381) Appendix 1 The End of the Theban Affiliation with the Second Athenian Confederacy
Thebes’ participation in the Second Athenian Confederacy has commonly been acknowledged from interpreting several pieces of evidence.1 One of them is a passage from Diodoros’s text; the other three are epigraphic sources: (i) the “charter” of the Second Athenian Confederacy; (ii) a decree by the synedrion of this Confederacy; and (iii) a list of Athenian ships, in the form of the tabula curatorum navalium, from 373–372. On close inspection, none of them provides definite proof of Theban participation in the Second Athenian Confederacy.
Diodoros says that the Thebans were an ally of Athens and of the Second Confederacy, and that after the attack of Sphodrias they were admitted into the common council (synedrion) of the Second Confederacy “on equal terms,” which has been commonly interpreted as implying membership for Thebes in the Second Confederacy.2 Diodoros, however, does not say this: his reference to the Thebans being admitted “on equal terms,” in fact, underlines the special position held by the Thebans. They expressly received a status that was equal to that of members in the Confederacy’s synedrion, precisely because they were not members of the Confederacy. The other two written accounts of these events do not support Thebes’ membership in the Second Confederacy either. When reflecting on the aftermath of Sphodrias’s attack, Xenophon only says that after the attack and the subsequent acquittal of Sphodrias, the Athenians furnished the Piraeus with gates, set about building ships, and “gave aid to the (p.382) Boeotians with all zeal.”3 Xenophon, who disliked the Thebans, would have been eager to point to Thebes’ participation in the Confederacy led by Athens. However, he says nothing about this matter in the Hellenica, whereas elsewhere he speaks broadly about the Athenian “leadership”: “[D]id not the Thebans place themselves under the leadership of the Athenians (ἡγεμονεύειν αὑτῶν ἔδωκαν Ἀθηναίοις) in return for our good offices? Yet once again, it was not the effect of coercion on our part, but of generous treatment, that the Lacedaemonians permitted the Athenians to arrange the leadership as they chose (ἐπέτρεψαν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας θέσθαι ὅπως βούλοιντο).”4 The latter phrase refers to the alliance concluded between Athens and Sparta, and their respective allies, in 369.5 Xenophon uses the word hegemonia here, therefore, in a very broad sense, probably reflecting the fact that the proposal for this alliance came from the Spartans. Thus, we should not put too much weight on the Athenian hegemonia in the first phrase either: here, too, the “Athenian leadership” referred to the treaty of alliance. According to Plutarch, after Sphodrias’s attack, the Athenians “with the greatest zeal renewed their alliance with the Thebans” and became active on the sea.6 Neither Diodoros nor these two authors thus say that the Thebans ever became a member of the Second Confederacy.
Plutarch’s words about Athens’ “renewal of the alliance with Thebes” might refer to their alliance of 395,7 which obviously had to be dissolved after the King’s Peace.8 However, Diodoros makes a clear distinction between those Greeks who allied themselves with Athens and her allies on the one hand, and members of the Athenian alliance (i.e., the Second Confederacy) on the other. It was possible, therefore, to be an ally of Athens (or of Athens and her Confederacy) without being a member of this Confederacy. This was obviously the status of those cities that had made an alliance with Athens before the emergence of the Second Confederacy, that is, in the late 380s (such as Chios and probably Chalcis)9 and early 370s (such as Mytilene, Byzantium, and Methymna),10 which were mentioned together with several other cities in the “charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy” under the heading “The Allies of Athens.”11 The same document (p.383) expressly claims that future allies of Athens and her Confederacy will be in the same position as Chios and Thebes, thus implying that the latter two were not among the members of the Confederacy: ἐπὶ δὲ τ[οîς] αὐτοîς ἐφ’ οἷσπερ Χîοι καὶ Θηβαîοι κα[ὶ] οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι.12
When one looks at this grouping of Athenian allies, it is tempting to view it as a continuation (though not necessarily a direct one) of the practice that had existed in the time of the Athenian arche in the fifth century, when the allies of Athens were divided (at least nominally) into (i) “independent (autonomous) allies,” that is, those that contributed ships for joint operations and were thus equal in status to Athens; and (ii) “subject allies” that were subordinate to Athens and contributed (sometimes, as a result of the use of force) tribute to the Athenians.13 The first group comprised the allies of Athens, whereas the second comprised the members of her alliance. The prominence of Chios in both the Athenian arche in the fifth century and in the Second Confederacy seems to be significant—the most important allies of Athens were big naval powers: according to Aristotle, Chios, Lesbos, and Samos occupied a special position in the Athenian arche.14
Isocrates shows that Athenian allies were divided into the same two groups in the 350s, that is, those that helped her militarily, and those that paid contributions (syntaxeis) and obeyed orders.15 Epigraphic evidence confirms that some Athenian allies, such as Andros, contributed the syntaxis in the 350s.16 The book by Patrice Brun, the only existing specific treatment of the syntaxis, did not distinguish between Athenian allies that paid this contribution and those that did not,17 probably because Brun believed strongly that all Athenian allies were members of the Second Confederacy, as he also demonstrated elsewhere.18 In his opinion, therefore, even the Thebans, who are only attested as having contributed ships for joint naval campaigns with Athens, were expected to pay the syntaxis as well, because he thought that Thebes was a member of the Second Confederacy.19 But this can hardly be considered a valid argument.
Aeschines confirms that the same two groups of Athenian allies were still present in the 340s, whereas epigraphic sources show that the syntaxis continued to be contributed as late as (p.384) the 330s.20 The presence of the two groups of Athenian allies in the 340s is also revealed by the peace of Philocrates, which was concluded between “the Athenians and their allies” on the one hand, and Philip II of Macedonia on the other. According to Demosthenes, the Athenian envoys “had failed to draw the treaty, as they first tried to do, that is with a clause excepting the Halians and the Phocians (ὡς ἐπεχείρησαν οὗτοι τὸ πρῶτον “πλὴν Ἁλέων καὶ Φωκέων” γράψαι), and Philocrates had been compelled by you to erase those words and write expressly, ‘the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians’ (Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους).”21 This evidence has caused a great deal of controversy,22 because, as Kahrstedt correctly noted, there was no need to specifically mention Halys and Phocaea, irrespective of whether or not these two cities were Athenian allies.23 Kahrstedt’s “allies,” of course, meant members of the Second Athenian Confederacy because the Athenian allies that swore to the peace of Philocrates in 346 are thought to have included only the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy.24 If Halys and Phocaea were members of the Confederacy, the general clause would have covered them anyway. If they did not belong to the Second Athenian Confederacy and, therefore, received no protection from the peace arranged between Athens and Philip,25 that is, even if they might have been allies of Athens alone, why were they the only two cities to be mentioned? An argument can be made that Halys and Phocaea, although not members of the Confederacy, were represented at the synderion with a status similar to that of the members. This situation seems to have been close to what had happened in 371, when Athens specifically invited Thebes to join in the new (Sparta) Peace,26 whereas the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, although expected to swear individually to this Peace,27 were supposed to merely follow Athens.
The fact that the two groups of Athenian allies continued to be organized on the same principles in the 370s, 350s, 340s, and 330s (although their rights and responsibilities were not necessarily the same as those of the Athenian allies in the fifth century) certainly once again raises a question about the nature of this document, which was referred to as the “Prospectus of the Second Athenian League” in the recently published authoritative corpus of Greek inscriptions.28 The presence of Thebes in this document neither does nor is able to prove, therefore, Theban participation in the Second Athenian Confederacy. At best, we can speak about a Theban affiliation with that Confederacy.
It is also noteworthy that we hear of “the Boeotians” immediately after the liberation of the Cadmea, both before the attack of Sphodrias on the Piraeus (when Diodoros speaks of the “unity” of the Boeotians around Thebes) and after this attack (when Xenophon refers to resumed military cooperation between Athens and Thebes).29 Such evidence allows us to (p.385) suggest that the resurrection of the Boeotian Federation began very soon after the liberation of the Cadmea.30 Still, when it comes to the alliance that was (re)established with Athens and the affiliation with the Second Athenian Confederacy, our sources—both literary (such as the texts of Diodoros and Plutarch) and inscriptional (the decree of Aristotle)—speak only of “the Thebans.”31 This evidence has been used for dating the restoration of the Boeotian Federation, and of the boeotarchy in particular, to after the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy.32 The above-mentioned literary evidence implies, however, that the use of either “the Thebans” or “the Boeotians” should not necessarily be explained only in chronological terms. On the one hand, the Athenians obviously did not want to acknowledge the Boeotian Federation by making a treaty with it as a whole; for the same reason, a few years later the Athenians would strongly disagree with Thebes’ attempt at swearing on behalf of her allies to the Peace of 375.33 On the other hand, the Second Athenian Confederacy allowed only individual participation, and the Thebans, of course, did not want to be listed alongside Theban allies; they would assume this same stance at the debates of the treaties of Peace in 375 and 371. References to “the Thebans” and “the Boeotians” concerned, therefore, different political entities: the Boeotian Federation began to be refounded soon after the liberation of the Cadmea, hence references to “the Boeotians.” However, since the Thebans did not want to abandon their leadership of Boeotia by swearing to the Athenian Confederacy alongside their Boeotian allies, and since Athens did not want to acknowledge the Boeotian Federation, the only alliance that the Thebans could make was that between their city and Athens; hence ancient sources make references only to “the Thebans.”34
The next piece of evidence that has been used to prove the participation of Thebes in the Second Athenian Confederacy is an inscription from 372 B.C. It was discovered in 1936, published by Oliver, and then republished by Wilhelm and Accame.35 This inscription is thought to have consisted of two decrees: one by the Athenians and the other by the synedrion of the Second Confederacy. The second decree, which interests us the most, reads as follows:36
This inscription has been interpreted by Oliver and those following him as referring to a decision of the Second Confederacy, which was adopted at the synedrion presided over by a Theban.37 This interpretation can hardly be the only possibility, however. There is no indication in this text that the Theban who made the proposal was a member of the synedrion, much less its “president,” even though this is possible if, as we have seen above, the Thebans had been admitted into the synderion “on equal terms.”38 Oliver referred to this inscription as “the first of its kind to be preserved.”39 It has remained the only such document of this type since then because, it seems, the proposal was put forward not by a regular member of the Confederacy but by an ally and was then accepted by the “confederates” (ἔδοξεν τ[οî]ς [συ]μμάχοις).40 The content of this proposal, which served to protect the political and economic stability of individual cities, may have reflected the growing tensions between Thebes and Athens in the late 370s, when each of them tried to pull the allies of the other over to her side (see below). If this interpretation is correct, this decree offers another insight into the uneasy relationship between Athens and Thebes at that time.41 In the end, the decree only confirms what we have read in Diodoros: the Thebans participated in the synedrion on equal terms with the members of the Second Confederacy. Like the text of Diodoros, and those of Xenophon and Plutarch, this decree offers no concrete proof that Thebes was a member of the Second Confederacy.
(p.386) ἐπὶ Ἀ[σ]τ[ε]ί[ο] ἄρχοντος, Σκιροφο−
[ριῶνος] ἕνηι κ̣α̤ὶ [νέα]ι, ἐ[πιψηφί]ζοντος
[.]υ[ … Θ]ηβαίο, ἔδοξεν τ[οî]ς [συ]μμάχοις·
[μ]η̣δ̣[έν]α̣ οἴκω[ν] ἤ̣κ̣λ̣[ήρο] ἐ̣[ξελάσ]α̣ι καὶ μη−
δ̣ὲν̣ [πρᾶ]ξαι βίαιο[ν] π̣α̣ρ̣[ὰ] τάδε· ἐ[ά]ν τις ἀ−
ποκ[τείν]ηι, [τ]ε̣θ̣[ν]ά̣[ν]αι καὶ τ[ὸ]ς α[ἰ]τίος τ−
õ θα[νάτ]ο̣υ̣ κ̣ρ̣[î]ν̣αι [δῆ]μον καὶ [βο]λὴν κατ−
ὰ τὸς [θ]εσμός· ἐ̣[ὰν] δ̣[έ] τ̣ις [ἐξελ]α̣ύ̣[ν]ηι ἢ φυ−
γαδε̣[ύ]η̣ι [τιν]ὰ̣ π̣αρὰ τ̣ὸ[ς θεσ]μὸς καὶ τὸ [ψ−]
[ή]φι[σμα τ]ό̣[δ]’ ἄ̣[τιμ]ος [ἔ]σ[τω … ]ανες [..]
Finally, a list of Athenian ships, in the form of the tabula curatorum navalium, from 373–372, refers to two ships “returned” by “the Thebans.”42 The regular, and therefore quite ordinary, (p.387) type of this document; the use of the verb ἀποδίδωμι, and the reference to “the Thebans,” that is, not “the Boeotians,” all suggest that this information should be taken at its face value: at some point in the past the Thebans returned these ships to Athens, as the two sides had previously agreed.43 This tabula may have reflected Thebes’ participation in Athenian naval operations: a speech from the Demosthenic corpus mentions payments the Athenian made to the “Boeotian trierarchs.” Judeich, Cloché, and, more recently, Dreher and Stylianou have interpreted this information as reflecting the events of 373 and as concerning Thebes’ membership in the Second Confederacy.44 In their opinion, therefore, Theban membership in this Confederacy lasted until at least 373. However, this evidence can also pertain to the Theban refusal to contribute money for joint naval operations, which, together with other reasons, eventually led the Athenians to subscribe to the Peace of Sparta in 375, as Xenophon says.45 On the eve of the Sparta Peace of 371, according to Xenophon, the Athenians specifically contacted Thebes concerning Athens’ plan to establish peace with Sparta. Surprisingly, this passage from Xenophon has been ignored in debates dealing with the problem of Thebes’ participation in the Second Confederacy, even though Georg Busolt pointed to it a long time ago as proof that Thebes was not a member of the Confederacy by early 371,46 thus assuming Theban membership in the Confederacy prior to that time. But these words by Xenophon show that Thebes and Athens continued to cooperate closely, which would be unlikely if Thebes had just departed from the Second Confederacy. This cooperation, therefore, existed within the framework of their own alliance, as Cloché suggested in a later work.47
In sum, the debate about when Thebes ceased to be a member of the Second Confederacy becomes problematic in itself because—in the absence of any clear and direct information to the contrary—one can just as easily postulate that Thebes never became a member of the Second Confederacy at all.48 It is certain, however, that the Thebans were Athenian allies,49 and as such they were affiliated with the Second Confederacy. After all, the decree of Aristotle mentions them together with other allies of Athens and the Second Confederacy. It is possible, therefore, to ask a question about the date when the Thebans’ alliance with Athens and their affiliation with the Second Confederacy came to an end. Meyer, Marshall, and Hornblower thought that the Thebans left the Second Confederacy when they refused to subscribe to the Sparta Peace in 371.50 The Thebans wanted to swear to that Peace on behalf of other Boeotian (p.388) cities; this move was opposed by the Athenians. Yet the Athenians had made similar protests at the Peace of 375 as well.51 This whole episode has been reinterpreted by those trying to establish some sort of causal connection between a city’s participation in the Second Confederacy and this city’s partaking in the Peace of 375. For example, V. J. Gray argued that “Thebes was a member of the Athenian Confederacy in 373 which would have been impossible if she had not sworn to the peace of 375,” and John Buckler believed that “as a free ally of Athens and its other allies [sic], Thebes retained its autonomy and freedom, and thus could sign in its own right.”52 But this is precisely what the Thebans did not want to do: they preferred to sign treaties of Peace on behalf of the Boeotians, whereas the Peace of 375 denied them this right by formally protecting the “freedom” and “autonomy” of Greek cities, including those of Boeotia, which were required to join this Peace on an individual basis. For the reason that every city was supposed to swear individually, the fact that the Thebans signed the Peace of 375 only in their own name does not offer an indication about Thebes’ relationship with either Athens or the Second Athenian Confederacy. The same would happen in 371: all cities were required to swear individually to this new Peace,53 because the Peace of 371 (quite like those of 386 and 375) protected the “freedom” and “autonomy” of all Greek cities, including those of Boeotia. The Thebans eventually refused: swearing to this Peace only for themselves would have meant rejecting their claim to control Boeotia.54 It is clear that the refusal of Thebes to join the Sparta Peace of 371 had no relevance to Thebes’ affiliation with Athens and the Second Confederacy.
Two more relevant episodes need to be examined. One of them is that after the establishment of the Sparta Peace of 371 but prior to the battle of Leuctra the Thebans sent their families to Athens for safety.55 Admittedly, this fact by itself neither proves nor disproves the existence of a formal treaty between the two cities: in what looks like a similar case, many Thebans fled for refuge to Athens when Phoebidas occupied the Cadmea in 382, that is, when it was unlikely that there was any formal treaty between Athens and Thebes.56 Still, the information about the retreat of Theban families to Athens in 371 demonstrates cordial relations between the two cities on the eve of the battle of Leuctra, which would have been out of place if Thebes had just left the Second Confederacy. The second such episode is the refusal of Athens and other members of the Second Confederacy (as we know them from the decree of Aristotle) to help the Thebans at Leuctra, which can be explained by the fact that the Sparta Peace, similar to the King’s Peace and the Peace of 375, did not acknowledge military alliances. Although they were Theban allies, the Athenians preferred to not break the Sparta Peace; they had behaved in the same way in 387, when they refused to help the Thebans against Sparta and renounced their alliance with Thebes, and in 385, when the Athenians had declined to help Mantinea against the Spartans, even though Athens and Mantinea had a treaty of alliance:57 had the Athenians provided help to Thebes or to Mantinea in the mid-380s, it would have been a breach of the King’s Peace. On both occasions, therefore, Athens was formally in the right.
(p.389) Cargill and Buckler have suggested that “Thebes’ definitive separation” from the Second Confederacy resulted from the signing of the Athens Peace, reasoning from the fact that, according to Buckler, the Second Confederacy “had refused to protect [Thebes] in the face of the Spartan threat.”58 But this rationale is valid only if one assumes that Thebes participated in the Second Confederacy. And the Sparta Peace, to which Athens had just sworn, forbade military alliances, as did the Peace of 375 to which Thebes had subscribed earlier. The Athenians, therefore, had no formal obligation to help Thebes militarily, that is, just as they were not obliged to help Thebes and Mantinea in the mid-380s. The Athens Peace and the Second Confederacy were certainly two different matters. How could the provision about compulsory help to the “wronged parties” (which Cargill and Buckler associated with the Athens Peace) alienate Thebes from the Second Confederacy if Thebes were a member of the Second Confederacy (which, according to the decree of Aristotle, obliged its members to help each other) and if Thebes did not participate in the Athens Peace? Another argument has been that while reference to the Thebans has been preserved in the decree of Aristotle (ll.24–25, 79), one to Jason, the tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly and an ally of Athens, is absent. If the name of Jason was erased after his death in 370, as some have suggested, the Thebans could have remained affiliated with the Confederacy even after 370.59 Of course, this is just a possibility. We do not know if Jason was mentioned in this place at all,60 and if he was, much depends on whether Jason was a member of the Second Confederacy or a separate ally of Athens. The possibility that Jason had a separate alliance with Athens has already been examined.61
Political developments after the battle of Leuctra show that the relationship between Athens and Thebes was finally severed in 370. Soon after that battle and the establishment of the Athens Peace, the Arcadians and the Elaeans appealed to Athens, suggesting that an alliance against Sparta be formed. On receiving no response, they turned to the Thebans, who arrived and established their own domination in the Peloponnese.62 According to Xenophon, it was at this point that the Athenians realized that the balance was being tipped to the Theban side and gave floor to the ambassadors from Sparta and her allies. Debates followed, and the decision to help Sparta against Thebes was reached.63 The Athenians would later consider their refusal to help the Arcadians in 370 to have been one of their biggest mistakes, one that furthered the position of Thebes.64
(p.390) Xenophon’s words also mean that the embassy of the Spartans and their allies was already in Athens at the time of the Theban invasion of the Peloponnese.65 However, the ambassadors were invited to speak only after the Theban invasion, which shows that the Athenian attitude toward Thebes changed only when it became clear that the Thebans wanted not only to demolish the dominance of Sparta but to establish their own in its place. Something else that the Athenians probably considered before allying themselves with Sparta was the threat from Thebes to the Second Confederacy. This surfaced in 370 when Euboea, a former member of the Second Confederacy, supplied its military contingents to Thebes. Another former Athenian ally, the Acarnanians, went over to Thebes at the same time.66 The Thebans built a hundred triremes as well as dockyards and made Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium friendly to Thebes by forcing the Athenian general Laches to sail away with his fleet.67 The alliance led by Thebes was eclipsing the Second Confederacy,68 thus provoking an open competition between the two military alliances.69 It is hard, therefore, to consider the decision of the Athenians to establish an alliance with Sparta as a “short-sighted, wasteful, and politically dangerous” policy.70 In a similar fashion, the Athenians tried to pull away Spartan allies in 371. The Thebans would attempt to do the same by inviting Spartan allies to join the (failed) Thebes Peace in 367 (when the ambassadors of Thebes went first to Corinth) before establishing separate treaties of peace with them in 366–365.71 For these reasons, it is possible that the affiliation of Thebes with the Second Confederacy lasted, at least nominally, until 370, that is, as Cawkwell has suggested, even though he referred to Thebes’ “membership” in the Second Confederacy, of course. In 369, Athens and Thebes stepped onto a collision course over Thessaly, so that the Athenians sent the expedition of Iphicrates to Amphipolis and concluded an alliance with Sparta.72
(1.) Among the most important works: Parke, “Development,” 75; Amit, Great and Small Poleis, 110 (the Second Athenian Confederacy was “based on the alliance between Athens and Thebes”); Bengtson, Geschichte 5, 276 (“nominally”); Cargill, League, 102; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 375–376; Buck, Boiotia, 93; Seager, “Confederacy,” 168; Dreher, “Poleis,” 171, 173; Cawkwell, Thucydides, 103; Stylianou, Commentary, 246, 252, 322; Welwei, Athen, 280; Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 285, 286–287; Buckler, Greece, 225–226, 238, 300; Rhodes, History 2, 265, 267; Buckler and Beck, Central Greece, 38, 42, 138.
(2.) Diod. 15.28.5 (before the attack of Sphodrias), 15.29.7 (after this attack). See preceding note.
(3.) Xen. Hellen. 5.4.34.
(4.) Cf. Xen. Poroi 5.7.
(6.) Plut. Pelop. 15.1.
(7.) R&O 6 = IG II2 14 = GHI 101 = Syll.3 122 = Staatsverträge 2, no. 223, with Cawkwell, Thucydides, 94. See also FGrH 328 (Philochoros) F 148 with Harding, in The Story of Athens, 143, who believed that this excerpt from Philochoros referred to the treaty of alliance between Athens and “the Boeotians” in 395.
(8.) E.g., Plut. Pelop. 14.1 with J. C. Trevett, “Demosthenes and Thebes,” Historia 48 (1999): 189, on Athens and Thebes already “acting in concert” in Chalcidice in 382, and Xen. Hellen. 5.2.15 on the Athenians and “Boeotians” negotiating with Olynthus about an alliance in 383–382. On Thebes and Olynthus: Hornblower, Greek World 3, 231. On the symmachia (?) between Athens and Thebes: IG II2 40 (= Staatsverträge 2, no. 255). 1–10 (378–377 B.C.).
(9.) Chios: R&O 20 (= IG II2 34 = GHI 118 = Syll.3 142 = Staatsverträge 2, no. 248) (384–383 B.C.). Chalcis: IG II2 44 = GHI 124 = Syll.3 148 (384–383 B.C.), but see next note.
(10.) Mytilene and Thebes: IG II2 40 = Staatsverträge 2, no. 255 (378–377). Byzantium: IG II2 41 = GHI 121 = Staatsverträge 2, no. 256 (378 B.C.). Methymna: R&O 23 = IG II2 42 = GHI 122 = Staatsverträge 2, no. 258 (378–377 B.C.?), and probably Chalcis, depending on the dating of this inscription: IG II2 44 = GHI 124 = Syll.3 148 (with Sinclair, “King’s Peace,” 40–42: 379–378 B.C.) = Staatsverträge 2, no. 259 (377 B.C.) with Stylianou, Commentary, 227, 270 (“midsummer 377”) and the same opinion in Brun, Impérialisme, no. 47.
(11.) R&O 22 (= IG II2 43 = GHI 123 = Syll.3 147 = Staatsverträge 2, no. 257 = Brun, Impérialisme, no. 46).78–83 (377 B.C.).
(12.) R&O 22 (= IG II2 43 = GHI 123 = Syll.3 147 = Staatsverträge 2, no. 257 = Brun, Impérialisme, no. 46).23–25 (377 B.C.). Cf. Buckler and Beck, Central Greece, 83, who made a close conclusion, when they spoke of “two stages in the evolution of the Athenian League, in the first of which individual states allied themselves with Athens on the same terms as had the Chians and Thebans. Next, a number of other states created their broad alliance on equal terms.”
(13.) E.g., Thuc. 6.85.2 (see p. 19, n. 36). This division is thought to have been ignored in practice: de Ste. Croix, “Character,” 16–21; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 34, 307; Bickerman, “AUTONOMIA,” 328–330; M. Dreher, Hegemon und Symmachoi: Untersuchungen zum Zweiten Athenischen Seebund (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1995), 19–20.
(14.) Arist. Ath.Pol. 24.2. See also L. J. Samons II, Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000), 91 (with n. 40): on the status of Athenian allies in the 450s as reflected by their presence on, or absence from, the quota list. He discussed the latter case, which concerned the allies that contributed not cash but ships, with reference to Samos, Chios, and Lindos. For their special status, see also p. 105.
(15.) Isocr. 7.1–2, dated to 358 or 357 B.C.: R. W. Wallace, in HSCP 90 (1986): 78.
(16.) IG II2 123 (= GHI 156).11-12 (c.357–356 B.C.).
(17.) P. Brun, Eisphora—syntaxis stratiotika: Recherches sur les finances militaires d’Athènes au IVe siècle av. J.-C. (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1983), 74–76.
(18.) Brun, Eisphora—syntaxis stratiotika, 89; Brun, Impérialisme, 16, 139, 322.
(20.) Aeschin. 2.86, 3.74; Brun, Eisphora—syntaxis stratiotika, 76–83.
(21.) Dem. 19.159; see also 19.278.
(22.) See a summary of opinions in Staatsverträge 2, pp. 314–318, and, more recently, Worthington, Philip II, 98–99.
(23.) Kahrstedt, Unteruschungen, 132–133.
(24.) E.g., N. Sawada, in Kodai. Journal of Ancient History 4 (1993): 23, 25; MacDowell, Demosthenes, 321.
(25.) As A. Efstathiou, in Historia 53 (2004): 391–392.
(26.) Xen. Hellen. 6.3.2 (see n. 46 below).
(27.) Diod. 15.38.3.
(28.) Cf. Rhodes and Osborne, in R&O, p. 100: “a prospectus, inviting states outside the area reserved in the Peace of Antalcidas for Persia to join an already existing League” (italics added).
(29.) Diod. 15.28.1; Xen. Hellen. 5.4.34 (see n. 3 above).
(30.) For suggested datings, see p. 39, nn. 169–172.
(31.) Diod. 15.28.5, 15.29.7; Plut. Pelop. 15.1 (see nn. 2 and 6 above); R&O 22 (= IG II2 43 = GHI 123 = Syll.3 147 = Staatsverträge 2, no. 257 = Brun, Impérialisme, no. 46).23–25 (see n. 12 above) and 74–75, 79 (377 B.C.), with Thiel, “De synoecismo Boeotiae,” 22. Cf. Dem. 14.34, 38–39: on the prospect of “the Thebans” changing sides and allying themselves with the Spartans.
(32.) Cawkwell, “Epaminondas,” 275–276; Dreher, “Poleis,” 178. Pace B. Bleckmann, Fiktion als Geschichte: Neue Studien zum Autor der Hellenika Oxyrhynchia und zur Historiographie des vierten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 83, on “Boeotians” and “Thebans” in such places as de facto synonyms.
(33.) Cf. Diod. 15.38.2-4.
(34.) Cf. Buckler, “Survey,” 324, and Rhodes, History 2, 283: “perhaps the Thebans were trying to join the League in the name of Boeotia, and Athens was resisting.” However, what prevented the Thebans from changing their status as representing all the Boeotians later on (and eventually leaving the Confederacy altogether, if they were not allowed to do so), i.e., similar to what they did at the Peace conference in 375 and, again, in 371?
(35.) J. H. Oliver, “Inscriptions from Athens,” AJA 40 (1936): 461–463, no. 2; A. Wilhelm, Vier Beschlüsse der Athener (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1940), 3–12, no. 1; Accame, La lega, 230.
(36.) SEG 31, 67.14-23 = R&O 29.ii.
(37.) Oliver, “Inscriptions,” 463: “a Theban put the decree to a vote in the Synedrion of the Allies”; Accame, La lega, 231–235; J. A. O. Larsen, Representative Government in Greek and Roman History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955), 61; Larsen, States, 176; Cargill, League, 163–164 (with his translation of ll.17–23); Rhodes and Osborne, ad R&O 29.ii (see next note); Rhodes, History 2, 267.
(38.) Diod. 15.29.7 (see also n. 2 above). Cf., e.g., the commentary by P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne ad R&O 29.ii (on p. 149): “the synedrion was presided over not by an Athenian but by one of its own members.”
(39.) Oliver, “Inscriptions,” 463.
(40.) Cf. Bengtson in Staatsverträge 2, no. 268: “Beschluss der Bundesgenossen des 2. Attische Seebundes (372, Sommer),” who avoided discussing the presence of a Theban in this text.
(41.) A similar view has been offered by Accame (La lega, 235–244) and accepted by Cargill, League, 163–165, who, however, interpreted both decrees as referring to the secession of member states from the Second Confederacy and believed that Thebes belonged to the Second Confederacy as well.
(42.) IG II2 1607.49: [nomen triremis τῶν ἀνεπ]ικληρώτων· ταύτην ἀπέδοσ[αν] Θηβα[î]οι ἀν[επίσκευον—] and 155: Ἀφροδισία, ἣν Θ[ηβαîοι ἀπ]έδοσαν· ταύτη[ι δεî τὰ ξύλινα] σκεύη Χαλκ[ιδέα παραθεîναι] καὶ ἐπισκ[ευάσαι τὴν ναῦν—] (373–372 B.C.).
(43.) So also, e.g., Dreher, Hegemon, 30–31.
(44.) [Dem.] 49.14, 48-54; Judeich, “Athen und Theben,” 183, 185; Cloché, La politique, 74; Dreher, Hegemon, 21–24, 32–34; Stylianou, Commentary, 322. See also MacDowell, Demosthenes, 104 and 105-106 (on the date of the speech: either the early or the late 360s).
(45.) Xen. Hellen. 6.2.1; see also Diod. 15.38.3–4 (see n. 51 below). Cf. Bengtson, Geschichte 5, 276–278, who presented the Peace of 375 as an anti-Theban arrangement of Sparta and Athens. Pace Buckler, “Survey,” 324. For conflicts between Athens and Thebes concerning naval operations: Hornblower, Greek World 3, 239.
(46.) Xen. Hellen. 6.3.2. Busolt, Bund, 786–787.
(47.) Cloché, Thèbes, 117–126, on Thebes “supplying several ships to the Athenians” in 373 (with reference to [Dem.] 49 and IG II2 1607), 137, carefully avoiding any mention of Thebes’ participation in the Confederacy.
(48.) A summary of the evidence: Dreher, Hegemon, 84–86.
(49.) Also Brunt, “Euboea,” 245, on Athens and Thebes as allies “from 395 to 386, and again from 378 to 371,” without referring to Thebes’ participation in the Confederacy.
(50.) Meyer, Geschichte 4, 5:396–397; F. H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905), 73–74; Hornblower, Greek World 3, 242; cf. Buckler, Greece, 285. Xen. Hellen. 6.3.19-20.
(51.) Diod. 15.38.3–4.
(52.) Gray, “A Case Study,” 310 n. 15; Buckler, “Survey,” 324.
(53.) Xen. Hellen. 6.3.19; Diod. 15.50.4.
(54.) See, e.g., the argument between Agesilaos and Epaminondas (p. 21, n. 53).
(55.) Diod. 15.52.1. Schwenk, “Athens,” 8, referred to the Thebans as an ally of Athens at the time of Leuctra.
(56.) Xen. Hellen. 5.2.25-5.2.31; Isocr. 14.28; IG II2 37; Plut. Pelop. 6.2–3 for Theban exiles who were outlawed.
(57.) Thebes: Plut. Pelop. 14.1 (see n. 8 above). Mantinea: Diod. 15.5.5 (see p. 29, n. 97); their alliance, which also included Argos and Elis, required military help if member states were assaulted: Staatsverträge 2, no. 193 (420); Seager, “Confederacy,” 156–157.
(58.) Cargill, League, 165, 192; Buckler, Greece, 300. But see Buckler and Beck, Central Greece, 42–43: “by refusing to agree to the Spartan Peace of 371 the Thebans had put themselves outside of the Confederacy.”
(59.) The death of Jason: Xen. Hellen. 6.4.20–32; Diod. 15.54.5. This opinion: Momigliano, Terzo Contributo, 444, who dated the alleged erasure of Jason’s name from the stele to “before 371”; Jehne, “Symmachie,” 133; Dreher, “Poleis,” 175, 186; Hornblower, Greek World 3, 240; S. Sprawski, Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431–370 B.C. (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 1999), 84–89.
(60.) E.g., Gray, “A Case Study,” 312–313 (with reservations); Jehne, “Symmachie,” 123, 125–126 (whose idea that Jason participated in the Second Athenian Confederacy was largely based on his a priori acknowledgment of Thebes’ membership in this Confederacy: 124, 132–134); Rhodes and Osborne, in R&O, p. 105.
(62.) Athens: Dem. 16.12 and Diod. 15.62.3. Thebes: Xen. Hellen. 6.5.19-20, 6.5.22-32. Cf. Paus. 8.6.2.
(64.) Dem. 16.12; see Cloché, La politique, 100–102; Cawkwell, “Epaminondas,” 265–266.
(65.) Xen. Hellen. 6.5.33.
(66.) Xen. Hellen. 6.5.23 on the Arcadians, Argives, Eleans, Euboeans, Locrians, Acarnanians, Heracleots, Malians, and Thessalians as on the side of the Thebans after Leuctra. Brunt, “Euboea,” 247, and Buckler, Greece, 297, thought that the Euboeans (as well as Chalcis, Eretria, Carystos, and Histiaia) seceded from the Second Confederacy and joined the Theban side immediately after Leuctra, i.e., in 371; pace Busolt, Bund, 796; Cloché, La politique, 131; Cawkwell, “Euboea,” 45: the Euboeans left the Confederacy by the winter of 370–369; and J. Buckler, in Polis & Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 438: on the Acarnanians joining the Boeotian Federation in 370 B.C.
(67.) Diod. 15.79.1 with Debord, L’Asie Mineure, 297–299.
(68.) Roy, “Thebes,” 188–189.
(70.) Buckler, Greece, 310, 312.
(72.) Hornblower, Mausolus, 195–196; Buckler, “Survey,” 328: “The formal end of the alliance [sic] came with Epaminondas’ first invasion of the Peloponnesos, when the Athenians entered into a formal alliance with Sparta against Thebes.” The expedition of Iphicrates: Aeschin. 2.27; Dem. 23.149. See Appendix 2.