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The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement$
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Daniel A. Crane

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780195372656

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372656.001.0001

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Antitrust Federalism

Antitrust Federalism

(p.145) 8 Antitrust Federalism
The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

Daniel A. Crane (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter deals with a series of long-standing and sometimes difficult federalism issues in the United States. Modern federalism principles allow both races to the top and races to the bottom but neither the top nor the bottom is likely to be the most favorable locus for antitrust policy. There is no doubt that federal law has the constitutional right to supremacy and it is up to Congress to retrieve this supremacy.

Keywords:   modern federalism, races, Congress, United States, federal law, supremacy

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