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The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement$
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Daniel A. Crane

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780195372656

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372656.001.0001

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Regulation, Adjudication, and Administration

Regulation, Adjudication, and Administration

(p.93) 5 Regulation, Adjudication, and Administration
The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

Daniel A. Crane (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers risks associated with the antitrust vs. regulation dichotomy, i.e. the possibility that typology does not capture the full range of conceptual and institutional approaches to market power problems. The “administration”, which is considered as the third category, lies somewhere between antitrust and regulation. It uses the most successful institutional approaches for solving problems with which the antitrust enterprise is concerned and offers an appealing model for institutional evolution. This administrative system focused on limiting the future exercises of market power and intellectual property, and was regarded as being much more effective than the adjudicatory system.

Keywords:   antitrust, dichotomy, typology, conceptual approach, institutional approach, administration, adjudicatory system

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