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The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement$
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Daniel A. Crane

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780195372656

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372656.001.0001

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Private Enforcement: Growth, Backlash, and Spillovers

Private Enforcement: Growth, Backlash, and Spillovers

(p.49) 3 Private Enforcement: Growth, Backlash, and Spillovers
The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

Daniel A. Crane (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The creation of a private right of action for damages has led to the significant decision to separate antitrust from corporate regulation. This conceptualizes a freestanding tort. This chapter explains that the allowance for private enforcement and the payment of damages was not entirely an American innovation instead it derived from the 1623 English decree of monopolies. There exists a significant difference between the private right of action created under the act of monopolies and that created under the Sherman Act. There is no limitation on Sherman's private right of action for damages included in trade agreements. The meaning of monopoly has now shifted from one describing an exclusive governmental grant to a more general meaning, which includes any body holding a strong market position.

Keywords:   antitrust, freestanding tort, private enforcement, monopolies, private rights, Sherman Act, trade

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