The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement
The debates between two competing conceptualizations of antitrust led to the creation of two federal antitrust agencies: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. There is something curious about the dual-agency structure of federal antitrust enforcement, despite the fact that the two agencies are not purely redundant and that overlapping agency jurisdiction is not unusual. This chapter shows that the design of the antitrust agencies was not the product of a unified draftsman but that the structure itself was inelegant, redundant, and often problematic. Efforts to change this structure have repeatedly failed. Whether this sentiment is practical common sense or just timidity, the time will come when political forces transpire to bring the American dual-agency structure into the public spotlight.
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