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Reconciling Our AimsIn Search of Bases for Ethics$

Allan Gibbard

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195370423

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370423.001.0001

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(p.189) Bibliography

(p.189) Bibliography

Reconciling Our Aims
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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