Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Philosophy of David Kaplan$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195367881

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 15 November 2018

Directing Intentions

Directing Intentions

(p.187) CHAPTER 11 Directing Intentions
The Philosophy of David Kaplan

John Perry

Oxford University Press

Kaplan finds demonstratives puzzling. He offers only one theory of indexicals; once the right distinctions are made, the facts about the semantics of indexicals are “obvious and incontrovertible.” The case is otherwise with demonstratives. He says at the end of his discussion in “Afterthoughts”: “There is something I'm not understanding here, and it may be something very fundamental about the subject matter of logic.” This chapter develops a version of Kaplan's Directing Intentions Theory and argues in its favor, and indicates how this version might help with the logical problems that vex Kaplan.

Keywords:   demonstratives, indexicals, logic, Directing Intentions Theory

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .