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Belief about the Self
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Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

Neil Feit

Abstract

Some of our beliefs are fundamentally about ourselves: these are beliefs about who we are, where we are, and which features we have. Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions. Propositions are things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. The main thesis of this book is that this supposition is mistaken and must be replaced with another view about content. The view that belief contents are propositions breaks down in the face of belief about the ... More

Keywords: attitudes, content, de se belief, property, proposition, self-ascription

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2008 Print ISBN-13: 9780195341362
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Neil Feit, author
SUNY Fredonia
Author Webpage

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