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Rationality and the Reflective Mind$

Keith Stanovich

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195341140

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.001.0001

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Source:
Rationality and the Reflective Mind
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Oxford University Press

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