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Beyond ReductionPhilosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science$
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Steven Horst

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195317114

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.001.0001

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The Scope and Plausibility of Cognitive Pluralist Epistemology

The Scope and Plausibility of Cognitive Pluralist Epistemology

Chapter:
(p.151) 8 The Scope and Plausibility of Cognitive Pluralist Epistemology
Source:
Beyond Reduction
Author(s):

Steven Horst (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0009

This chapter argues for the plausibility of Cognitive Pluralism as a general principle of cognitive architecture, and argues further that scientific pluralism is plausibly seen as a special case of this general principle. Cognitive Pluralism is compared with existing ideas of modularity.

Keywords:   Cognitive Pluralism, cognitive architecture, models, idealization, representational system, modularity, localization, brain, massive redeployment, domain‐specificity, frames, evolutionary psychology

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