Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Conscious Brain$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jesse Prinz

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780195314595

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314595.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 25 March 2019

Whose Consciousness? The Illusory Self

Whose Consciousness? The Illusory Self

(p.213) 7 Whose Consciousness? The Illusory Self
The Conscious Brain

Jesse J. Prinz

Oxford University Press

Many authors, including Descartes and Kant, have assumed that the self is somehow presented to us in experience. Those who believe in a phenomenal self sometimes try to reduce it to something else, such as an experience of the body, while others think it is irreducible. Following Hume, this chapter argues against both options, claiming that there is no phenomenal self—or more accurately, the self cannot be experience as a subject, but only as an object, such as a body. Philosophical arguments and neuroscientific evidence for a phenomenal self is critically reviewed. Phenomena considered include: feelings of ownership and authorship, the feeling of losing oneself, the experience of one’s body as a self, and the alleged role of the self in conscious unity. None of these phenomena establish a phenomenal self. The chapter ends by suggesting that the self may nevertheless be implicit, rather than explicit, in experience.

Keywords:   the self, the subject, bodily experience, Cartesian ego, ownership and authorship experiences, Hume

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .