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The Conscious Brain$
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Jesse Prinz

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780195314595

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314595.001.0001

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Which States Can Be Conscious? Cognitive Qualia Reduced

Which States Can Be Conscious? Cognitive Qualia Reduced

(p.149) 5 Which States Can Be Conscious? Cognitive Qualia Reduced
The Conscious Brain

Jesse J. Prinz

Oxford University Press

The AIR theory of consciousness applies only to perceptual representations, because other kinds of representations, include some used in higher cognition, are not hierarchically organized or amenable to direct attentional modulation. This may suggest that the theory is incomplete, because some authors claim that there can be distinctively cognitive phenomenology. Such authors can be called expansionists because they expand consciousness beyond perception. This chapter defends restrictivism, the view that only perceptual states can be conscious. Alleged cases of cognitive phenomenology are reviewed, and it is argued that that each case can be explained in terms of perceptual phenomenology, including the experience of inner speech. Five reasons are also given for rejecting the claim that there is distinctively cognitive phenomenology.

Keywords:   cognitive phenomenology, restrictivism, expansionism, conscious thoughts, language

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