Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Conscious Brain$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jesse Prinz

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780195314595

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314595.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 18 March 2019



AIR Compared

(p.332) Conclusion
The Conscious Brain

Jesse J. Prinz

Oxford University Press

This chapter evaluates the AIR theory (attended intermediate-level representations) against the desiderata presented in Chapter 1. The AIR theory explains the subjective character by appeal to vectorwaves. It explains the fact that consciousness arises at the first-order, by appeal to attention, which does not require meta-representation. It explains the fact that consciousness does not rely on central systems, because attention involves availability to working memory, but not necessarily encoding. It explains unity by attentional resonance. It explains the possibility of selfless experience, by denying a phenomenal self. It relates the function of consciousness to action selection. It integrates levels of explanation by appeal to neurofunctionalism. And it appeals to the nature of working memory encodings to explain phenomenal knowledge. The AIR theory does a better job with these desiderata than some other theories.

Keywords:   The AIR theory of consciousness, desiderata on theory of consciousness, attention

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .