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Value-Free Science?Ideals and Illusions$
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Harold Kincaid, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195308969

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308969.001.0001

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 Rejecting the Ideal of Value‐Free Science

 Rejecting the Ideal of Value‐Free Science

Chapter:
(p.120) 6 Rejecting the Ideal of Value‐Free Science
Source:
Value-Free Science?
Author(s):

Heather Douglas

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308969.003.0009

This chapter begins by explaining why nonepistemic values are logically needed for reasoning in science, even in the internal stages of the process. It then bolsters the point with an examination of ways to block this necessity, all of which prove unsatisfactory. Finally, it argues that rejection of the value-free ideal does not demolish science's objectivity and that we have plenty of remaining resources with which to understand and evaluate the objectivity of science. By understanding science as value laden, we can better understand the nature of scientific controversy in many cases and even help speed resolution of those controversies.

Keywords:   nonepistemic values, value-free ideal, reasoning, objectivity

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