How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory
Andrew Guzman
Abstract
Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point that states comply only when it is in their self‐interest to do so, the book demonstrates that international law nevertheless supports cooperation among states. This book develops a theory of international law to explain how concerns about reciprocal non‐compliance, retaliation, and reputation discourage states from violating their international legal commitments. By building a theory from the gro ... More
Applying rational-choice theory to international law and international relations, this book offers a comprehensive theory of the subject, how it operates, and why it works. Taking as a starting point that states comply only when it is in their self‐interest to do so, the book demonstrates that international law nevertheless supports cooperation among states. This book develops a theory of international law to explain how concerns about reciprocal non‐compliance, retaliation, and reputation discourage states from violating their international legal commitments. By building a theory from the ground up, this book is able to address international law in all its forms, including treaties, customary international law, and “soft law.” It explains that contrary to conventional views on the subject, there is no stark difference between these different types of international law. Rather, each represents a position on a spectrum of commitment and is distinguished by the strength of the obligation it imposes. Once the various legal forms are recognized as different in degree rather than kind, other features of the system are easier to understand. The book discusses how the substantive content of an international agreement relates to its form, including whether the agreement provides for dispute resolution, monitoring, exit, escape, and reservations. With respect to customary international law, this book explains how and why such rules of law work, and how existing notions of custom must be adapted to accommodate the rational choice approach.
Keywords:
international law,
coercive enforcement,
reciprocity,
prisoner's dilemma,
tribunals,
risk,
international relations,
rational‐choice theory
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2008 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780195305562 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001 |