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Repeated Games and ReputationsLong-Run Relationships$

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300796

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001

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(p.619) Bibliography

(p.619) Bibliography

Source:
Repeated Games and Reputations
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

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