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Repeated Games and Reputations
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Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Abstract

This book begins with a careful development of fundamental concepts, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. It synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in repeated games and reputations, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout; they are interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications of the theory. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games as well as those using repeated games as to ... More

Keywords: folk theorem, perfect monitoring, private monitoring, public monitoring, relationship, repeated game, reputation

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2006 Print ISBN-13: 9780195300796
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

George J. Mailath, author
University of Pennsylvania
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Larry Samuelson, author
University of Wisconsin
Author Webpage