Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Lines of ThoughtCentral Concepts in Cognitive Psychology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Lance Rips

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780195183054

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183054.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 April 2019



(p.57) 2 Numbers
Lines of Thought

Lance J. Rips (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter canvasses proposed connections between minds and numbers that might make knowledge of mathematics possible. The goal is to determine whether any promising leads are available in accounting for people's ability to represent math objects. It argues that we have certain primitive concepts (e.g., CAUSE in the case of physical objects, UNIQUENESS in the case of mathematical ones) and certain primitive operations (instantiation, recursion, and other procedures specialized for concept combination) that allow us to form schemas or theories for both physical and mathematical domains. We may then posit that the best of these theories are true—that they correctly describe the nature of our world—and that the objects they describe are elements of that world. Such a schema-based approach has advantages over most current theories of mathematical knowledge.

Keywords:   mathematical objects, number learning, number meaning, concepts of number, math schemas, mathematical knowledge

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .