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A Place for ConsciousnessProbing the Deep Structure of the Natural World$
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Gregg H. Rosenberg

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195168143

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.001.0001

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On the Possibility of Panexperientialism

On the Possibility of Panexperientialism

Chapter:
(p.91) 5 On the Possibility of Panexperientialism
Source:
A Place for Consciousness
Author(s):

Gregg Rosenberg

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.003.0005

Panexperientialism is the view that experience exists throughout nature and that mentality is not essential to it. In this chapter, the possibility of panexperientialism is examined by looking on its strengths and weaknesses from the point of view of a Liberal Naturalist. To understand the theoretical option of having a panexperientialist world, the author assumed that every subject of experience possessed a field of experience containing a variety of phenomenal qualities called qualitative field. Evidence for panexperientialism's existence and its coherence are also discussed in detail in this chapter.

Keywords:   panexperientialism, Liberal Naturalist, panexperientialist world, qualitative field, nature, mentality

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