Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Why David Sometimes WinsLeadership, Strategy and the Organization in the California Farm Worker Movement$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Marshall Ganz

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195162011

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195162011.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 18 September 2018

Launching a New Union (1966–1967)

Launching a New Union (1966–1967)

Chapter:
(p.201) Seven Launching a New Union (1966–1967)
Source:
Why David Sometimes Wins
Author(s):

Marshall Ganz

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195162011.003.0007

When the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) affiliated with the AFL-CIO to become the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC), ethnic leaders, radical organizers, and the AFL found themselves on the same team for the first time in California history. Employer reaction to the DiGiorgio victory put the alliance to the test immediately. One consequence of the victory was that it inspired wine grape workers at Perelli–Minetti vineyards near Delano to join the strike. The Teamsters intervened by providing strike breakers, claiming to represent them, and signing a contract behind the UFWOC picket lines. Recognizing that they would become a Teamster “hunting dog,” driving one ranch after another into the Teamsters' sights if they didn't fight back, UFWOC launched a boycott of the company's wines despite the fact that the existence of a Teamster contract could inhibit labor support. By May 1967, it became clear to Perelli–Minetti and the other growers that a Teamster contract could not protect them from a UFWOC boycott. The Teamsters realized that without employer cooperation they could offer UFWOC little competition in the fields. All sides went to mediation, UFWOC suspended the boycott, the Teamsters withdrew from the fight, and Perelli–Minetti transferred the contract to UFWOC. How did affiliation with the AFL-CIO, despite the traditional labor movement's history of failure in the fields, enhance the NFWA's strategic capacity? Why couldn't the Teamsters devise a more effective strategy after their “responsible union” approach failed? When the Teamsters tried to learn from UFWOC by mimicking its tactics, why didn't it work? And how could the new union expand the scope and scale of its operations to be able to consolidate its success, fend off new challenges, and launch new initiatives? The answers can be found again, although at a whole new level, in the capacity to generate effective strategy.

Keywords:   National Farm Workers Association, Teamsters, Perelli–Minetti vineyards, farm workers, labor unions, strikes

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .