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Why Language Matters for Theory of Mind$
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Janet Wilde Astington and Jodie A. Baird

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159912

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159912.001.0001

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The Role of Language in Theory-of-Mind Development: What Deaf Children Tell Us

The Role of Language in Theory-of-Mind Development: What Deaf Children Tell Us

Chapter:
(p.266) 13 The Role of Language in Theory-of-Mind Development: What Deaf Children Tell Us
Source:
Why Language Matters for Theory of Mind
Author(s):

Peter A. de Villiers

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159912.003.0013

This chapter argues that deaf children provide a strong test for the causal role of language, because many of them have significantly delayed language acquisition but age-appropriate non-verbal intelligence and sociability. It compares the language and theory-of-mind abilities of two groups of deaf children: deaf children of hearing parents, whose language acquisition is delayed, and deaf children of deaf parents, whose language acquisition is not delayed. Across two studies, the chapter finds that deaf children who acquire fluent sign language early are significantly better at reasoning about mental states than language-delayed deaf children. Indeed, the theory-of-mind development of deaf children with deaf parents is comparable to that of their typically developing hearing peers. The chapter notes that both general verbal ability (vocabulary) and specific syntactic features of language (false complement structures) are independently predictive of false-belief reasoning in deaf children. Thus, this chapter demonstrates why language matters for theory of mind and the theory that mastery of the syntax of complementation is what provides the representational mechanism for reasoning about false beliefs.

Keywords:   deaf children, language, language acquisition, sign language, reasoning, mental states, verbal ability, false beliefs, syntax, complementation

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