Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Architecture of ReasonThe Structure and Substance of Rationality$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Robert Audi

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195158427

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 April 2019

Global Rationality

Global Rationality

(p.195) 8 Global Rationality
The Architecture of Reason

Robert Audi (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that if we have a unified, comprehensive account of rationality for both domains, we should have much of the theoretical material needed to understand the notion of a rational person. But the matter is complicated. There are tradeoffs; for instance, a high degree of theoretical rationality might counterbalance some degree of practical irrationality, and no rational person need exhibit rationality all of the time. Some irrational actions, and even isolated moments of a wider irrationality, are compatible with the overall rationality of a person. Indeed, if some things, such as certain emotions, may fail to be rational without being irrational, then it is entirely consistent with being a rational person that one cultivate certain non-rational elements in oneself and allow them to play a significant role in one's life.

Keywords:   desire, belief, will, attitudes, emotions, voluntariness, autonomy

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .