A Cornucopia of Quality
The idea of physical things as extensible qualified is so aptly related to our power to think experientially that it may serve us humans fairly well when it comes to our clearly conceiving physical individuals. Accordingly, the physical need not be so opaque to us as it sometimes seemed to many philosophers. When we speak of a certain quality exemplified in an individual, the matter is related more perspicuously by saying that the particular is qualified in a certain way. Whatever its deficiencies, the restrictive empiricism epitomized by David Hume should not be completely abandoned. Our power to experience cannot be our only resource for understanding concrete reality. This chapter examines the hypothesis that: in your fully conceiving a physical entity as being Monochromatic Spatially Extensible Blue, you will be (spatially Non-extensible) experiential blue. It also discusses the notion of spatially extensible colors, spatial bodies, insensate bodies as pervaded with tactile qualities, extensible qualities, experiential qualities, and metaphysics.
Keywords: physical things, metaphysics, physical reality, David Hume, empiricism, experience, concrete reality, spatially extensible colors, spatial bodies, experiential qualities
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