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Principles of Frontal Lobe Function$
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Donald T. Stuss and Robert T. Knight

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195134971

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195134971.001.0001

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Chronesthesia: Conscious Awareness of Subjective Time

Chronesthesia: Conscious Awareness of Subjective Time

Chapter:
(p.311) 20 Chronesthesia: Conscious Awareness of Subjective Time
Source:
Principles of Frontal Lobe Function
Author(s):

Endel Tulving

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195134971.003.0020

This chapter is about this human sense of time, referred to as chronesthesia, which is tentatively defined as a form of consciousness that allows individuals to think about the subjective time in which they live and that makes it possible for them to “mentally travel” in such time. It attempts to explicate the concept of chronesthesia, suggest what it is (and what it is not), contrast it with other kinds of time-related mentation, discuss the origin of the concept, and speculate on chronesthesia's relation to prefrontal cortex. The chapter concludes by discussing the role of chronesthesia in human evolution and human affairs.

Keywords:   sense of time, consciousness, mental travel, prefrontal cortex, subjective time

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