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Philosophy after ObjectivityMaking Sense in Perspective$
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Paul K. Moser

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780195081091

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195081091.001.0001

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Physicalism, Action, and Explanation

Physicalism, Action, and Explanation

(p.188) 5 Physicalism, Action, and Explanation
Philosophy after Objectivity

Paul K. Moser

Oxford University Press

This chapter contends that explanatory strategies, including physicalist explanatory strategies, is perspectival in the way justifications and reasons are. This chapter assesses the prospects for a physicalist account of intentional attitudes and intentional actions. The chapter also raises doubts about naturalizing all psychological and action theoretical notions in circulation. In addition, this chapter dulls the ontological edge, the presumption of objectivity that accompanies various physicalist theories in philosophy. The chapter uses the nonreductive physicalism of Donald Davidson to illustrate some of its main points, contending that Davidson's physicalism rests on some dubious ontological and methodological assumptions.

Keywords:   physicalism, action, explanation, reduction, global supervenience, modes of explanation, notion of inquiry, Donald Davidson, anomalous monism, intentional explanations

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