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Philosophy after ObjectivityMaking Sense in Perspective$
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Paul K. Moser

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780195081091

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195081091.001.0001

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Reasons, Truth, and Relativism

Reasons, Truth, and Relativism

Chapter:
(p.152) 4 Reasons, Truth, and Relativism
Source:
Philosophy after Objectivity
Author(s):

Paul K. Moser

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195081091.003.0005

This chapter examines relativism about reasons and relativism about concepts of reasons and truth. Purposive normative reasons, according to this chapter, are noteworthy. It explains how purposive normative reasons can contribute to solving a problem of normative relevance, the problem that non-motivating, purpose-independent normative, “reasons” and “requirements” seem too easy to come by. Purpose-independent “reasons” and “requirements” evidently can be introduced ad arbitrium. This chapter also looks at the internalist–externalist debate with conceptual instrumentalism: the view that one's aims, or purposes, in adopting and using a notion of rationality, reasons, or obligations can cogently recommend, at least to oneself, an internalist or an externalist notion of rationality, reasons, or obligations. Conceptual instrumentalism is one straightforward way to answer questions about what notion of rationality, reasons, or obligations one should adopt and use.

Keywords:   truth, reasons, relativism, practical ideals, practical relevance, internalism, instrumentalism, definite article, truth condition, concept of truth

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