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Philosophy after ObjectivityMaking Sense in Perspective$
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Paul K. Moser

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780195081091

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195081091.001.0001

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Justification, Meta-Epistemology, and Meaning

Justification, Meta-Epistemology, and Meaning

Chapter:
(p.60) 2 Justification, Meta-Epistemology, and Meaning
Source:
Philosophy after Objectivity
Author(s):

Paul K. Moser

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195081091.003.0003

One's explaining, evaluating, and arguing for epistemic justification and one's answers to questions about correct standards for such matters properly end in considerations about an operative notion for one regarding epistemic justification. This chapter has a basis for distinguishing purely conceptual problems in philosophy from empirical problems in the natural sciences. It suggests how readers may distinguish the two. In addition, this chapter allows for conceptual, or semantic, relativism. Different people can, and sometimes do, have different operative constitutive standards for the correct use of such terms as justification and warrant, at least at a level of specificity. Secondly, the chapter highlights some lessons of semantic foundationalism via two epistemological extremes from the philosophy of science: the “scientific-community authoritarianism” of Thomas Kuhn and the “epistemological-standard authoritarianism” of Rudolf Carnap.

Keywords:   semantic foundationalism, notions, conceptual commitments, justification, objections, metaphilosical lessons, preanalytic data, ultimate presupposition, relativism, Thomas Kuhn, Rudolf Carnap

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