Doxastic Control and Doxastic Obligations
This chapter gives a detailed version of the main problem that an account of responsible belief faces, namely that of doxastic involuntarism: it seems both that doxastic responsibility requires doxastic control and that we lack such control. In order to assess various responses to this problem, the chapter first explores the relation between obligation and control. It is argued that one has an obligation to φ only if people normally have control over φ-ing, one normally has control over φ-ing, or one has control over φ-ing in the situation at hand. Subsequently, four attempts to solve the problem of doxastic involuntarism are discussed: that according to which we have direct doxastic control, that according to which we have indirect doxastic control, that according to which we have compatibilist doxastic control, and that according to which having a doxastic obligation requires no doxastic control or influence. All are shown to be untenable.
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