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Responsible BeliefA Theory in Ethics and Epistemology$
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Rik Peels

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780190608118

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608118.001.0001

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The Problem

The Problem

Doxastic Control and Doxastic Obligations

(p.52) 2 The Problem
Responsible Belief

Rik Peels

Oxford University Press

This chapter gives a detailed version of the main problem that an account of responsible belief faces, namely that of doxastic involuntarism: it seems both that doxastic responsibility requires doxastic control and that we lack such control. In order to assess various responses to this problem, the chapter first explores the relation between obligation and control. It is argued that one has an obligation to φ‎ only if people normally have control over φ‎-ing, one normally has control over φ‎-ing, or one has control over φ‎-ing in the situation at hand. Subsequently, four attempts to solve the problem of doxastic involuntarism are discussed: that according to which we have direct doxastic control, that according to which we have indirect doxastic control, that according to which we have compatibilist doxastic control, and that according to which having a doxastic obligation requires no doxastic control or influence. All are shown to be untenable.

Keywords:   compatibilism, direct control, indirect control, influence, doxastic involuntarism, obligation

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