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Responsible BeliefA Theory in Ethics and Epistemology$
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Rik Peels

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780190608118

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608118.001.0001

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Doxastic Responsibility

Doxastic Responsibility

What Is It?

(p.14) 1 Doxastic Responsibility
Responsible Belief

Rik Peels

Oxford University Press

This chapter elucidates the basic issues of an account of responsible belief by providing an analysis of responsibility and clarifying some issues regarding belief. To be responsible is to be the proper object of one or more of the normative rather than evaluative attitudes, namely praise, blame, or neutral appraisal. To believe some proposition p is to occurrently, dormantly, or tacitly think that p. Whether or not one is responsible for a belief that p is a matter of whether one can be appropriately appraised for thinking that p. One believes responsibly if one is responsible for one’s belief and one believes blamelessly. Contrary to what Brian Weatherson claims, responsible belief does not require that one believe praiseworthily.

Keywords:   appraisal, blameless belief, dormant belief, evaluative attitude, normative attitude, occurrent belief, praiseworthy belief, responsibility, tacit belief, Brian Weatherson

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