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Giving Aid EffectivelyThe Politics of Environmental Performance and Selectivity at Multilateral Development Banks$
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Mark T Buntaine

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780190467456

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190467456.001.0001

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Accountability Mechanisms

Accountability Mechanisms

Civil Society Claims for Environmental Performance

Chapter:
(p.110) 5 Accountability Mechanisms
Source:
Giving Aid Effectively
Author(s):

Mark T. Buntaine

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190467456.003.0005

Sourcing information about the outcomes of projects from local people might provide an alternative pathway to better performance and more selective decisions about the allocation of development assistance. This chapter assesses whether the establishment of citizen complaint mechanisms has provided a pathway to selectivity in allocation of environmentally risky projects. It demonstrates that two conditions must hold to achieve more selective allocation: (1) civil society groups must be available to provide monitoring; and (2) they must provide monitoring about lending that is subject to high levels of oversight from donor countries. Civil society groups are more likely to be available as monitors when there is more organization around environmental issues in a country and where political freedoms are protected. Donor countries have more oversight over concessional lending resources that require regular replenishments. These results demonstrate that harnessing information from civil society groups can promote accountability for performance and selectivity.

Keywords:   environmental safeguard, environmental performance, accountability, complaint mechanism, civil society, monitoring, Inspection Panel, World Bank, selectivity

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