Civil Society Claims for Environmental Performance
Sourcing information about the outcomes of projects from local people might provide an alternative pathway to better performance and more selective decisions about the allocation of development assistance. This chapter assesses whether the establishment of citizen complaint mechanisms has provided a pathway to selectivity in allocation of environmentally risky projects. It demonstrates that two conditions must hold to achieve more selective allocation: (1) civil society groups must be available to provide monitoring; and (2) they must provide monitoring about lending that is subject to high levels of oversight from donor countries. Civil society groups are more likely to be available as monitors when there is more organization around environmental issues in a country and where political freedoms are protected. Donor countries have more oversight over concessional lending resources that require regular replenishments. These results demonstrate that harnessing information from civil society groups can promote accountability for performance and selectivity.
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