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Giving Aid EffectivelyThe Politics of Environmental Performance and Selectivity at Multilateral Development Banks$
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Mark T Buntaine

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780190467456

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190467456.001.0001

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The Problem of Performance

The Problem of Performance

(p.1) 1 The Problem of Performance
Giving Aid Effectively

Mark T. Buntaine

Oxford University Press

International organizations are involved with managing almost all problems that cross national borders. This chapter present the reasons why the performance of international organizations can fall short of expectations, with a particular emphasis on the environmental performance of the multilateral development banks. The core reason for the gap between mandate and results is often that the staff and management of international organizations do not have the same interests as member states or because they are uncertain about how to achieve desirable outcomes. After presenting these problems, this chapter outlines some of the ways that member states can respond to performance problems, such as administrative procedures, citizen complaint mechanisms, project evaluation, and strategic planning, giving specific examples related to environmental management. This chapter presents the data that will be used to examine whether these mechanisms achieve more selective allocation of environmentally risky and environment-improving projects in line with past performance.

Keywords:   performance, international organizations, discretion, selectivity, approval culture, World Bank, accountability, allocation, environmental management

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