Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Will to ReasonTheodicy and Freedom in Descartes$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

C.P. Ragland

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780190264451

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190264451.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 12 December 2018

The Gibieuf Connection and the Later Descartes

The Gibieuf Connection and the Later Descartes

(p.107) Chapter 4 The Gibieuf Connection and the Later Descartes
The Will to Reason

C. P. Ragland

Oxford University Press

This chapter draws on texts from outside the Meditations to argue that Descartes consistently endorsed the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Descartes follows Guillaume Gibieuf in denying that indifference is necessary for freedom, and this is sometimes taken as proof that the early Descartes rejected PAP. The chapter shows instead that the Gibieuf connection actually supports attributing PAP to the early Descartes. A survey of Descartes’ own later texts on freedom then shows that they explicitly endorse PAP, but also repeat claims from the Meditations that appear to conflict with PAP. Therefore, Descartes’ texts on freedom taken as a whole, from the Meditations forward, teach the same (somewhat confusing) pro-PAP doctrine.

Keywords:   Guillaume Gibieuf, Descartes, free will, indifference, determinism, alternative possibilities

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .