Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Seeing the FutureTheoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Kourken Michaelian, Stanley B. Klein, and Karl K. Szpunar

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780190241537

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 23 September 2018

Against Discontinuism

Against Discontinuism

Mental Time Travel and Our Knowledge of Past and Future Events

Chapter:
(p.62) 4 Against Discontinuism
Source:
Seeing the Future
Author(s):

Kourken Michaelian

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0004

Continuists maintain that, aside from their distinct temporal orientations, episodic memory and future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) are qualitatively continuous. Discontinuists deny this, arguing that, in addition to their distinct temporal orientations, there are qualitative metaphysical or epistemological differences between episodic memory and FMTT. This chapter defends continuism by responding both to arguments for metaphysical discontinuism, based on alleged discontinuities between episodic memory and FMTT at the causal, intentional, and phenomenological levels, and to arguments for epistemological discontinuism, based on alleged discontinuities with respect to the epistemic openness of the past and future, the directness or indirectness of the knowledge of past and future, and immunity to error through misidentification. The chapter concludes by sketching a positive argument for continuism.

Keywords:   episodic memory, future-oriented mental time travel, causal theory, misidentification, discontinuism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .