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Seeing the FutureTheoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel$
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Kourken Michaelian, Stanley B. Klein, and Karl K. Szpunar

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780190241537

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.001.0001

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Asymmetries in Subjective Time

Asymmetries in Subjective Time

(p.39) 3 Asymmetries in Subjective Time
Seeing the Future

Denis Perrin

Oxford University Press

Chapter 3 tackles the issue of the relationship between backward and forward mental time travel. It first charts the debate between continuism and discontinuism. It then makes a case for a moderate version of discontinuism with regard to the question of the processes involved in both forms of mental time travel. To do so, it provides a philosophical argument against the continuist position on episodic thought that is widely held by psychologists. More specifically, it points out and elaborates on the asymmetries in the epistemological (through the notion of immunity to error through misidentification) and causal process that are intrinsic to the subjectivity feature—or so-called autonoeticity—of episodic thought.

Keywords:   continuism, discontinuism, autonoeticity, episodic remembering, immunity to error through misidentification

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